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INTRODUCTION
Ernesto Miranda's surname has become a convenient shorthand for
the proposition that "procedure matters."' Miranda's story2 spawned
an ongoing controversy familiar to anyone who has watched a televi-
sion "cop" throw a television criminal against a studio wall and read
Visiting Instructor, University of Illinois College of Law. The author thanks Peter Appel,
Wayne LaFave, and Toni Massaro for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 435, 460 (1987).
2. For an account of Miranda's life as a Phoenix hoodlum, see L. BAKER, MIRANDA: Cm ,
LAW & POLITICS 9-12, 408-09 (1985). Baker's thoroughly researched book properly ascribes to Mir-
anda a critical role in this country's social, political and legal struggle to come to grips with
authority. Professor Kamisar gave the book high marks, although he had some difficulty with
Baker's treatment of the post-Miranda confessions cases. Kamisar, Miranda: The Case, the Man
and the Players (Book Review), 82 MICH. L. REv. 1074, 1083-88 (1984) [hereinafter Miranda].
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four well-known warnings from a card while handcuffing the "bad
guy" for the trip downtown.3 The so-called Miranda4 rights are the
only legal doctrine accessible through an intellectual diet limited to
prime-time television. Few cases have triggered as expansive a collection
of case law and scholarly commentary,' not to mention barroom,
3. Cf. L.A. Law (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 21, 1990) ("It's a very sad day when a
murderer's conviction is overturned on a technicality. But I assure the People this Office is com-
mitted to keeping that man in prison.") (prosecutor's statement to media after fictional California
Supreme Court ordered new trial for convicted murderer); Miami Vice: Yankee Dollar (NBC tele-
vision broadcast, Feb. 26, 1986) ("This isn't justice. You guys are changin' the rules; you're
changin' the rules.") (apprehended drug dealer's statement as vice officers, who had guaranteed
him immunity from prosecution in exchange for cooperation, arrested him for murder). Television
may be the most prolific method by which the laity familiarizes itself with criminal procedure, but
other popular media like newspapers serve a- similar "educational" function. See, e.g., Leach,
Better Ways for Justice than Boycotts, Nashville Banner, April 19, 1990, at A17, col. I ("I was
angry on behalf of the law enforcement officers who are tired of putting their lives on the line
every day and being told they have to take their sweet time to give every possible assassin the
benefit of every possible doubt."). As two commentators have observed, see Rosenberg & Rosen-
berg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C.L. REv. 69, 69-71
(1989), even the cartoon superhero the amazing Spiderman has encountered the problem. See
Houston Chron., Jan. 12, 1989, at D10, Jan. 13, 1989, at E8, Jan. 14, 1989, at ES, Jan. 16,
1989, at D8, Jan. 17, 1989, at D8 (when Spiderman crashed through store window, rescued rob-
bery hostage from gunman in view of officers and television cameras, and turned perpetrator over
to authorities, officers' failure to administer warnings freed suspect on "technicality," wfiich, al-
though designed "for society's protection," in Spiderman/Peter Parker's view, "protect[ed] the
criminal and endanger[ed] society!").
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. The literature on the topic is vast. The doctrine's roots are deep, in fact, Biblical. For
historical perspectives of the "privilege," compare L. LEvy, Tim Osuonts OF TE FIFTH AhaND-
mENT (1968) with Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the
European Is Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REY. 962 (1990). See generally Benner, Requiem for Mir-
anda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WAsH. U.L.Q.
59 (1989).
Below I have cited only a portion of the iiteratur, which represents equally charges both that
Miranda went too far and that it did not go far enough. See generally F. IimAu, 1. REm & J.
BUcxLEy, CRI MNAL INTERROGATION A" CoNr ssroNs (3d ed. 1986); Allen, The Judicial Quest for
Penal Justice: The Warren Court & the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518; Caplan, Question-
ing Miranda, 38 V"rD. L. REv. 1417 (1985); Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation -
And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. Cnnm. L. & CRDMOLOGY 699 (1988); Frey,
Modern Police Interrogation Law: The Wrong Road Taken, 42 U. Prrr. L. REv. 731 (1981);
Gangi, The Inbau-Kamisar Debate: Time for Round 2?, 12 WEsTERN ST. U.L. Ray. 117 (1984);
Goldberg, Escobedo and Miranda Revisited, 18 AxRON L. REV. 177 (1984); Grano, Miranda's
Constitutional Dtfficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 174 (1988);
Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind: Formalism's Triumph over Substance and Rea-
son, 24 AM. Clam. L. Ray. 243 (1987); Grano, Selling the Idea To Tell the Truth: The Profes-
sional Interrogator and Modern Confessions Law, 84 MICH. L. Rv. 662, 676 (1986); Grano,
Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW U.L.
REY. 100 (1985); Inbau, Over-reaction - The Mischief of Miranda v. Arizona, 73 J. Cnnm. L. &
CRIMiOLOwGY 797 (1982); Ingber, Procedure, Ceremony and Rhetoric: The Minimization of Ideo-
logical Conflict in Deviance Control, 56 B.U.L. REv. 266 (1976); Israel, Criminal Procedure, the
Burger Court and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 Mica. L. Rzy. 1320 (1977); Ogletree, Are
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streetcorner, and living-room discourse. 6
Despite this outpouring of commentary, neither the Court nor its
critics has accounted adequately for one critical component of Miran-
da's holding: whether police interrogation of a suspect who is "in cus-
tody" "or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way" is
subject to its dictates. 7 This italicized language has been lost through a
basic misunderstanding of the synergistic nature of the custodial inter-
rogation dynamic, and, perhaps as well, through "subversive interpreta-
tion, '" 8 driven by a perceived need to improve protection for persons
and their property.'
This Article attempts to resurrect a concept crucial to the Supreme
Court lexicon. It is not, however, a police manual)10 This Article con-
Confessions Really Good for the Soul?, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1826 (1987); Rosenberg & Rosenberg,
supra note 3; Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional Law or Judicial Fiat?, 26
WAsHBuRN L.J. 1 (1986); Schulhofer, supra note 1; Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying
Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C.L. REv. 699 (1974); Stone, The Mir-
anda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 122 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds.);
Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Cm. L. Rav. 190 (1988); Miranda v. Arizona,
24 Am. Camm. L. REv. 193 (1987) (Symposium); Note, The Public Safety Exception to Miranda
Careening Through the Lower Courts, 40 U. FLA. L. Rv. 988 (1988) [hereinafter Public Safety
Exception).
6. Everyone has an opinion about criminal procedure, although the lay perspective typically is
preoccupied with a tragic legal system that tolerates and perpetuates lawyers whose sole mission in
life is to get criminals off on technicalities. To be sure, many laypersons, typically unfamiliar or
unconcerned with the difference between civil and criminal law, associate the daily fare of "law-
yering" primarily with the dilemma, faced either reluctantly by good lawyers or eagerly by unsa-
vory ones, of defending guilty clients in criminal prosecutions. When, however, the neighborhood
ax-murderer goes free because police misspelled his name on the arrest warrant, then the law has
become pointless "legalism" and invocation of sacred terms like "due process" is inappropriate.
Cf. United States v. Christian, 571 F.2d 64, 69 (1st Cir. 1978) (by signing waiver form too far
above the designated line, Dyer Act suspect had not validly waived his rights, thus confession was
inadmissible). Under modern confessions law, however, no societal interest in convicting the guilty
warrants subjecting the privacy and autonomy of citizens to the fluctuating sense of fairness of
police, prosecutors, judges and legislators. Consequently, a few lost convictions are preferable to a
system in which the government makes and breaks the rules as it goes along. See, e.g., Fuller,
American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEO. ED. 457, 484 (1954) ("Justice itself de-
mands that the law be certain and sure, that it should not be interpreted and applied one way
here and today, another there and tomorrow."); L. FULLER, THE MoRALrTy OF LAw 38-39 (rev.
ed. 1969) (eight ways for legal system to miscarry are: 1) no rules; 2) unpublicized rules; 3) retro-
active rules; 4) incomprehensible rules; 5) contradictory rules; 6) unobeyable rules; 7) constantly
changing rules; and 8) inconsistent administration of rules).
7. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 445 (emphasis added); id. at 444, 467, 477, 478.
8. See Dripps, supra note 5, at 701 ("subversive interpretation" is inconsistent with principled
constitutionalism).
9. See F. ATTEN, TE DECLINE OF THE REHABLITATIvE IDEAL 88 (1981) (decline in public con-
fidence in authority leads to society where people and property must be protected from "unwar-
ranted aggressions" of other members of society); cf. Caplan, supra note 5, at 1469 (law
enforcement needs advantages in doing what society has asked it to do).
10. A host of commentators have performed that task in spades. See generally A. AUBREY &
1991]
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cerns itself solely with questions surrounding the admissibility of con-
fessions, and in so doing, attempts to show that only a reconsideration
of custodial interrogation can restore the "significant deprivations" lan-
guage to the status granted it in Miranda v. Arizona. 1
Part I canvasses the Court's six decisions that expressly or tacitly ini-
tiated, advanced, or altered the sweep of significant deprivations of
freedom for purposes of Miranda. Part II examines the problems that
plague the interrogation prong of the Miranda Court's two-part custo-
dial interrogation inquiry. Analysis of the interrogation prong is inte-
gral to this Article's theory that much of what makes the Miranda
doctrine "slippery," "murky," and "difficult' '1 2 is traceable to a basic
misunderstanding of the synergistic relationship of custody and interro-
gation. With this in mind, Part III proposes a custodial interrogation
model sensitive to the way this synergy impacts the two otherwise sepa-
rate concepts of custody and interrogation. The Article's emphasis on
synergy revives and augments the Court's lost admonition that it is the
"interplay of custody and interrogation that 'subjugates a suspect to
the will of his examiner.""' 3 Although the word "interplay" did not
appear in Miranda, the concept was gleaned from it in Rhode Island v.
Innis, 4 presumably after the justices or their law clerks read Professor
Karnisar's 1978 article on interrogation, where the term first appeared."
R. CAPUTO, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (3d ed, 1980); W. DmNsTN, TECHNIQUES FOR THE CRIME
INVESTIGATOR (2d ed. 1974); F. INBAU, J. REID, & J. BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS (3d ed. 1980); C. O'HARA & G. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
(5th ed. 1980); R. ROYAL & S. ScrUrr, THE GENTLE ART OF INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION:
A PROFESSIONAL MANUAL AND GUIDE (1976); Dripps, supra note 5; Graham, What is "Custodial
Interrogation"?: California's Anticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 UCLA L. REV.
59, 82-83 (1967); Ogletree, supra note 5. Whether police realistically can be expected to carry
advance sheets of the Supreme Court's sophisticated pronouncements on confessions law poses an
interesting questio.n, better answered in another project.
11. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, 445, 467, 477, 478.
12. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 359 (1985) (Brennan J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 309,
316).
13. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299 (1980) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at
457).
14. 446 U.S. 291, 299 (1980) ("[tlhe concern of the Court in Miranda was that the 'interroga-
tion environment' created by the interplay of interrogation and custody would 'subjugate the indi-
vidual to the will of his examiner' and thereby undermine the privilege of self-incrimination")
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 457-58).
15. Y. Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What Is "Interrogation"? When
Does It Matter?, in Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGAtION AND CONFESSIONS. ESSAYS IN LAW AND
POLICY 139 (1980) [hereinafter KAwasAR ESSAYS]. The source of the term, still undeveloped and
unapplied in both cases and literature, is the following:
It is the impact on the suspect's mind of the interplay between police interrogation
and police custody - each condition reinforcing the pressures and anxieties produced
[Vol. 28:1
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By reading custody and interrogation together rather than separately,
and by attempting roughly to quantify their impact on the reasonable
perceptions of suspects, the proposed model advances that, despite Mir-
anda's presumption of compulsion, the applicability of that presump-
tion is nonetheless a matter of degree. In determining the degree of
compulsion, courts must evaluate the level of compulsion created by
one component through the prism of the other.16
I. "SIGNIFICANT DEPRIVATIONS" IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. Background
Before Miranda, the prosecution could admit only "voluntary" con-
fessions at trial.17 Because the interrogation procedure was considered
part of the conviction process, it was subject to fourteenth amendment
due process requirements. As a rule, police tactics confined to subtle
psychological coercion yielded voluntary confessions, while those de-
rived from the "third degree" or physical torture were deemed involun-
tary and therefore unreliable. 8 In deciding whether to admit
confessions under the flexible "voluntariness" standard, the Court
seemed to regard everything as relevant but nothing as decisive. 19
Plainly the adversary system was ill-equipped to recapture what oc-
curred at the stationhouse.2 0
by the other - that, as the Miranda Court correctly discerned, makes 'custodial
police interrogation' so devastating. It is the suspect's realization that the same per-
sons who have cut him off from the outside world, and have him in their power and
control, want him to confess, and are determined to get him to do so, that makes
the 'interrogation' more menacing than it would be without the custody and the
'custody' more intimidating than it would be without the interrogation.
Id. at 195-96.
16. Absent any verifiably accurate method of measuring compulsion, any such attempt must
presume that differences in degree of compulsion occasioned by various police tactics and custo-
dial settings are discernible from the accounts rendered in appellate opinions.
17. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1935) (states may impose penalties for wit-
ness's failure to testify in court, but may not ignore that aspect of privilege that protects suspects
from compulsion of rack and thumbscrew). At common law, however, suspects were not so lucky.
They were sworn by oath to answer truthfully any question put to them. L. LEVY, supra note 5,
at 43-82; Benner, supra note 5, at 68-72; Helmholz, supra note 5, at 965.
18. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153 (1944) (condemning psychologically
coercive practice of prolonged incommunicado detention and interrogation); Lyons v. Oklahoma,
322 U.S. 596, 602 (1944) (voluntariness of confession determined by suspect's "mental freedom"
while confessing or denying participation in crime).
19. Caplan, supra note 5, at 1432.
20. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VANcD. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1986);
see Dripps, supra note 5, at 706 (in addition to inherent proof problems of credibility contests
between prosecution and defense, post-hoc suppression hearings were ill-suited to rigorous task of
determining what impact police tactics had on mental processes of criminal suspects).
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Miranda was the peak of the Court's gradual shift in focus from the
unreliability of involuntary confessions to notions such as autonomy,
dignity, fair play, and decency."' Ultimately, the Court's inability to de-
fine "voluntariness," coupled with the inconsistencies of case-by-case
review and an emerging sensitivity to the plight of criminal suspects led
to the Warren Court's sweeping rulemaking in Miranda.2 Miranda es-
tablished a per se rule excluding from trial incriminating statements
elicited during custodial interrogation not preceded by police warnings
and the suspect's waiver of fifth amendment rights.Y These rights, Mir-
anda held, flowed from the fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination. 24
21. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
172-74 (1952). This shift vested police officers with a Hobson's choice: they became both the
agents responsible for persuading suspects to confess, and the guardians of suspects' constitutional
rights. Dripps, supra note 5, at 701.
22. See Allen, supra note 5, at 535-37 (discussing vulnerability of exclusionary rule as tool of
deterrence); see also Developments in the Law - Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REv. 935, 954-84
(1966) (describing difficulty in distinguishing voluntary from involuntary confessions).
23. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 476-77. Absent "other fully effective means" to protect
the suspect's fifth amendment privilege, before interrogation, police must inform the suspect of his
right to remain silent and that anything he' says may be used against him. Police must also inform
the suspect of the right to counsel, to have counsel present during interrogation, and to have the
court appoint counsel if the suspect is indigent. id. at 444. In effect, Miranda has three holdings:
1) pressure unsupported by a legal sanction can constitute compulsion; 2) informal compulsion
pervades any custodial questioning, however brief; and 3) warnings dispel the compelling pres-
sures. Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 436.
The mere fact that Miranda signed a form indicating that he knew his legal rights fell short of
the "heavy burden" required of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of constitutional
rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475, 492. The waiver aspect of Miranda hias elicited a
continuous flow of scholarly response, much of which elaborates on Justice Stewart's point in oral
argument, later reappearing in Justice White's dissent, that Miranda was problematic because it
allowed a criminal suspect in an inherently coercive environment to waive important constitutional
rights. See, e.g., Alien, supra note 5, at 537 (curiously tentative posture of opinion itself with
respect to waiver and assistance of counsel reduces decision's impact on law enforcement prac-
tices); Ingber, supra note 5, at 280-95 (rhetoric and ceremony of Miranda placated blacks, indi-
gents, liberals, and academics but waiver provision took away its bite); Ogletree, supra note 5, at
1830-31 (only flat ban on all interrogations held outside presence of attorney will give content to
Miranda requirement of voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver). Cf. Schulhofer, supra note 1,
at 456 (projected impact of Miranda weakened by police lies, suspects' attempts to talk their way
out of trouble, and convictions obtained without confessions).
24. Neither the Supreme Court nor the attorneys representing Miranda were certain which
amendment - the fifth or the sixth - should guide the admissibility of Miranda's confession.
Kamisar, Miranda, supra note 2, at 1074, 1079 & nn.24-26. The fifth amendment basis for ex-
cluding coerced confessions actually is nothing new. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542
(1897) (whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, is "controlled by [the] ...
Fifth Amendment"). The Court ignored the constitutional underpinnings of Bram in subsequent
decisions, although in Miranda, the Court found it reliable. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 461-
62.
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The new rule replaced the due process standard, which by then had
lost much of its force, 25 with a more defendant-minded approach. That
approach favored the ills of overbreadth to those of case by case "vol-
untariness" review. The Court articulated a two-part inquiry to" deter-
mine whether the procedural safeguards had attached: first, whether the
suspect was in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any
significant way; and second, whether police interrogated the suspect.
2 6
The meaning of "custody" poses few problems. A suspect who is un-
der arrest or its equivalent is in custody for purposes of Miranda.27
Although the lengthy Miranda opinion never defined "interrogation,"
the Court fleshed out the concept fourteen years later as express ques-
tioning or its functional equivalent38
In contrast, the Court in Miranda never defined a "significant depri-
vation" of freedom. 29 Because so much of the fifty-four-page opinion
focused on the investigative ploys and good cop/bad cop routines men-
tioned in police interrogation manuals of that era, the Court now
claims to have intended only to reach circumstances endemic to the po-
lice-dominated atmosphere of the stationhouse. 30 The Court's crabbed
interpretation of the significant deprivation language misreads Miranda
for two reasons. First, the Court used the term five times in its opin-
ion, illustrating its integral role in the Court's rationale. 3' Second, if
the Court had meant only to protect suspects in the stationhouse then
it could have explicitly said so. The Court clearly envisioned alternative
opportunities for police abuse. Otherwise, police could avoid Miranda's
25. Cf. R. Dwo.KiN, TA~No Raorrs SERIousLY 110-23 (1978) (discussing "gravitational" and
"enactment" forces that rule exerts); Moffat, Judicial Decision as Paradigm: Case Studies of Mo-
rality and-Law in Interaction, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 297, 326 (1985) ("As long as satisfaction with
the application of accepted values to the situation continues, the paradigm remains useful. But
when other factors introduce themselves, the persuasive power of the old paradigm begins to
erode. The search for an alternative begins.").
26. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444.
27. Despite footnote 4 in Miranda, in which the Court claimed only to be interpreting the
"focus" test presented in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), it has been suggested that
Miranda merged custody and focus, while Escobedo viewed the two concepts as distinct. 1 W.
LAYAVE & J. IsRAr, CRnUNAL PRoCEDURE j 6.6, at 489 (1984). The short-lived Escobedo doctrine
triggered the right to counsel at the amorphous point where a suspect becomes the focus of an
investigation.
28. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 295-96 (any words or actions that police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit incriminating response constitute interrogation).
29. The idea has been attributed to Justice Black, who near the end of two days of oral
argument declared, "[t]he words of the Amendment are very simple, and they've been construed
as meaning that the Government mustn't compel a man to give evidence against himself anywhere,
at any time." L. BAKER, supra note 2, at 169.
30. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984).
31. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, 445, 467, 477, 478.
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strictures simply by shifting the locale of interrogations to squad cars,
sidewalks, back alleys, or hotel rooms.3 2
Courts and critics thus have agreed that Miranda applies in some
non-stationhouse settings. The dilemma lies in ascertaining which set-
tings. The Miranda Court stated that "[g]eneral on-the-scene question-
ing as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of
citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding." 33
Although this language has become a slogan of prosecution devotees, it
fails to define exactly which scenarios fall within Miranda. Defense at-
torneys, in turn, have seized (although less frequently and less success-
fully) upon a footnote in the majority's opinion that recognizes the
general belief among citizens that "you must answer all the questions
put to you by a policeman, or at least that it will be the worse for
you if you do not."13 4 These rather bare, conflicting observations dem-
onstrate that the specific meaning of significant deprivations of free-
dom cannot be found in Miranda itself. Nor does an adequate answer
lie in Miranda's successors.
The Court's pertinent decisions indicate that before the warnings re-
quirements are triggered, significant deprivations of freedom must fea-
ture the same degree of compulsion that prompted the Miranda
decision." The circumstances that satisfy this standard, however, are
easier to describe than to capture. Had the Court selected among the
four cases it reviewed in Miranda, at least one case featuring non-sta-
tionhouse interrogation, then it may have mitigated the confusion to
some extent. Instead, Miranda has generated a body of case law in
32. 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 27, § 6.6, at 291.
33. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 477. It has been suggested that questioning of "citizens"
was not affected, but questioning of "suspects" was. Pilcher, The Law and Practice in Field
Interrogation, 58 J. Cana. L.C. & P.S. 465, 486 (1967).
34. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 468 n.37 (quoting P. DEvLiN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECU-
TION IN ENGLAND 32 (1958)).
35. The Court chose Miranda and its three companion cases for their shared "salient fea-
tures." Id. at 445. None of the four defendants received a "full and effective warning of his
rights" before questioning, although the statements were admitted into evidence at all four trials.
Id. Each defendant was "thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police
interrogation procedures." Id. at 456-57. Because Miranda himself was an indigent Mexican defen-
dant, "seriously disturbed ... with pronounced sexual fantasies," "the potentiality for compul-
sion [was] forcefully apparent." Id. Further, in each case officials had conducted interrogations
ranging up to five days in duration, "despite the presence through standard investigating practices
of considerable evidence against each defendant." Id. In the Court's view, the need for confes-
sions in these cases was overstated.
Some evidence belies the Court's assertions, at least with regard to Miranda. See Miranda: Car-
rol Cooley Videotape (on file with Police Training Institute, Support Services Division, University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) (arresting officer states that interrogation of Miranda consisted
only of falsely telling suspect that he had been identified in line-up, and stating that no evidence
other than confession was available to police).
[Vol. 28:1
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which the reach of significant deprivations of freedom has waxed and
waned.16
B. The Early Cases
At the outset, Miranda appeared openly to favor suspects. In the
first two tests of its great new experiment, Mathis v. United States3 7
and Orozco v. Texas,38 the Court reversed the convictions of two de-
fendants, both of whom had incriminated themselves in non-station-
house settings.3 9 Mathis was in a Florida prison on an unrelated charge
when an IRS agent questioned him briefly pursuant to a "routine tax
36. Without specific reference to the significant deprivations aspect of Miranda, some observers
attribute any reductions in Miranda's force to a concerted anti-constitutional philosophy of legal
decisionmaking. See, e.g., L. LEvy, AGANIsT THm LAw 439, 441 (1974) (with Nixon Court, in-
creasing number of Warren Court opinions are for all practical purposes dead); Stephens, The
Burger Court: New Dimensions in Criminal Justice, 60 GEO. L.J. 249, 277 (1971) ("major expan-
sions of procedural rights have been slowed or halted completely"). This popular theory is not
without strong opposition. To some critics, many post-Miranda opinions lend themselves to inter-
pretations that protect Miranda as much as threaten it. See, e.g., Israel, supra note 5, at 1425
("Many civil libertarians might be well advised to examine the (Burger] Court's record carefully
and to push aside the fact that Richard Nixon appointed four members of th[at] ... Court.");
Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really
So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: ,THn
CouNTER-REvoLtIoN THAT WASN'T 82-90 (V. Blasi ed. 1983) [hereinafter Tm BURoE COURT]
(defending some of Burger Court's decisions as arguably defense-minded and dividing Chief Justice
Burger's tenure into two periods, pre-1980, or anti-Miranda period, and post-1980, or pro-Miranda
period); Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. Ci.
L.J. 405, 407-08 (1982) (same); Goldberg, The Burger Court 1971 Term: One Step Forward Two
Steps Backward?, 63 1. CRm. L.C. & P.S. 463, 463 (1972) (Burger Court confounded both camps
with ideologically mixed bag of decisions).
37. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
38. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
39. In a footnote, the Court in Miranda disclosed its views that nonstationhouse questioning is
less threatening to suspects:
In former times such questioning, if undertaken, would be conducted by police offi-
cers visiting the house or place of business of the suspect and there questioning him,
probably in the presence of a relation or friend. However convenient the modern
practice may be, it must normally create a situation very unfavourable to the sus-
pect.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 478 n.46 (citing a Scottish court's opinion in Chalmers v. H.M.
Advocate, [1954] Sess. Cas. 66, 78 (J.C.)). On the other hand, it has been argued that the source
of the confession, not just the locale, makes little difference in the final analysis:
[T]is hard upon a man to be obliged to criminate himself. Hard it is upon a man
.. to do anything that he does not like .... Suppose in both cases, conviction to
be the result: does it matter to a man, would he give a pin to choose, whether it is
out of his mouth ... or out of another's?
5 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, 230-31 (1827).
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investigation.' ' Once Mathis incriminated himself in his prison cell,
the government converted the investigation into a tax-fraud prosecu-
tion. 4' The defendant in Orozco, on the other hand, challenged the ad-
missibility of his confession to a murder on the ground that, absent
warnings, four officers' brief questioning of him in his bedroom at
4:00 a.m. violated his privilege against self-incrimination. His interroga-
tion, conducted several hours after a murder at the cafe El Farleto,
consisted of four questions, and took less than a half hour from arri-
val to departure of police.42
Justice Black's opinions for the Court in both cases were quite terse,
probably because he read Miranda on a literal level. 43 In Mathis,
Justices White, Harlan, and Stewart - three of the four Miranda
dissenters" - stayed true to their colors and admonished their col-
leagues for embarking on a "deeply troubling" extension of the "so-
called Miranda warnings" to "familiar surroundings" far removed
from stationhouse interrogation. 41 Justice Harlan concurred reluctantly
in Orozco, regretting Mathis but going along only out of respect for
stare decisis.4 Mathis has escaped critical attention, largely because no
restriction on freedom is more significant than incarceration, regardless
40. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. at 2.
41. Id. at 3.
42. Officers asked him: 1) his name; 2) whether he had been at-the El Farleto; 3) whether he
owned a pistol; and 4) where the pistol was located. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. at 330 (White, J.,
dissenting). Actually they asked five questions - they repeated question number four when
Orozco hesitated to answer. Id. at 325.
43. See G. DuwNr , Huoo BLAcK AND Tim JuDicuAL REvoLIUoN 404-05 (1977) ("[o]n freedom
from self-incrimination [Black] was perhaps even more literalist as he concurred with the Court in
Miranda v. Arizona that the privilege - with an affirmative statement of its availability and
nature - was demanded from the first moment of police custody"). Terse opinions tend to aug-
ment the significance of every word to relevant if not dispositive status. In that sense, they are
held perhaps to a higher standard of precision than a longer opinion, where questionable asser-
tions are more easily written off as dicta.
44. The fourth Miranda dissenter, Justice Clark, retired from the Court in the months between
Miranda and Mathis. President Johnson filled his vacancy with Justice Marshall, who did not
participate in Mathis.
45. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. at 6-8 (White, J., dissenting). In Orozco, Justice White
again dissented, this time lamenting the Court's extension of Miranda into "territory where even
what rationale there originally was disappears." Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. at 328-31 (White, J.,
dissenting). His view still is popular today. It looks to the factors that powered the Miranda
decision: prolonged interrogation carried out in isolation, resulting in physical or psychological
coercion to confess. By suppressing the "terse remarks of a man who has been caught, almost in
the act," Justice White feared that the Court had paved the way for a requirement that "police
arrest a man, bring him to the police station, and provide a lawyer, just to discover his name."
Id. at 331 (White, J., dissenting). These two dissents are largely duplicative of Justice White's
Miranda dissent, to which Miranda opponents have added little in 24 years.
46. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. at 327-28 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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of whether the incarceration is based on a charge related to the ques-
tioning. The only criticisms of Mathis are by those who remain deter-
mined to limit Miranda to its facts.
Unlike Mathis, Orozco generated some debate. The debate centered
on whether the level of deprivation should be viewed from the police
or the suspect's perspective. In the course of his opinion in Orozco,
Justice Black relied on the arresting officer's testimonial evidence to
show that the defendant was in custody.47 This reliance on subjective
evidence has been criticized for, inter alia, allowing the anomalous sup-
pression of confessions when a suspect honestly but mistakenly believed
he was free to go.48 Orozco's apparent reliance on the subjective per-
ceptions of police has since been discounted as aberrational 9 In its
place is an objective test, applied from the suspect's perspective, used
to determine whether a defendant suffered a significant deprivation of
freedom.50
The potentially anomalous result of a subjective test is, however,
overstated. Nothing in the opinion suggests that Justice Black viewed
police admissions at trial as controlling in every instance. Rather, his
allusion to a police officer's statement against interest is credible to
show that police, by their own admission, had created an atmosphere
that Orozco would likely find coercive. Officers' subjective motives
would in most cases be revealed in their objective conduct. An officer's
subjective intent, therefore, was (and still is by today's standard) useful
only as an indicia of the suspect's probable perceptions.5
Only by removing the officer's testimony would we know whether
Justice Black would have shifted his focus to the suspect's perspective,
and whether he nonetheless would have found that Orozco was in cus-
tody. His brief opinion in Mathis may provide a clue. There, he
reached the same result without any reference to the subjective intent
of the IRS agent . 2
47. Id. at 327.
48. See, e.g., W. LAFA E & J. ISRAEL, supra note 27, § 6.6, at 491-94 (discussing when inter-
rogation is custodial); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 442-43 (rejecting subjective-
motivations-of-police test); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346-47 (1976) (same); Y.
KAmsAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRnaNAL PRocEDuRE 585-86 n.e. (6th ed. 1986) (dis-
cussing approaches used by courts in determining when interrogation becomes custodial).
49. Supra note 48.
50. Y. KAieAR, W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 48, at 585-86.
51. In the interrogation context, it now is the law that an officer's subjective perceptions are
relevant to the objective inquiry into whether the officer should have known that his words or
conduct would elicit an incriminating response. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.7.
52. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. at 1.
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C. The Middle Years
After seven years of inaction, 3 the significant deprivations issue next
arose in Beckwith v. United States,5' in which the Court held that Mir-
anda permitted IRS agents to interrogate a suspect in a private home.
Although Beckwith generally is considered a retreat from Mathis and
Orozco, the better view interprets all three cases as logically consistent
and equally deferential to the principles of Miranda.
Unlike Mathis, who answered questions in an 8' x 10' cell, Beckwith
spoke with agents before going to work one morning while house-sit-
ting for a friend in suburban Washington, D.C. 51 Similarly, although
Orozco clearly stated that Miranda could reach at-home questioning,
"could" is the operative term. Orozco was rousted from bed at 4:00
a.m. by four officers who forcibly entered his room. Not only did
Beckwith face police at a more reasonable hour and in a less volatile
setting, he also received a nearly full panoply of warnings.5 6 These
warnings were deficient only in that they failed to apprise Beckwith,
who held a white-collar job, of an indigent's right to appointed coun-
sel.
Three years before Beckwith,57 and repeatedly since," the Court has
held that "technical" Miranda violations do not offend the Constitu-
53. While the significant deprivations issue lay dormant, Miranda meanwhile was taking a
beating in other areas, particularly with regard to the use of illegally obtained evidence for im-
peachment purposes. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 721-23 (1975) (statements obtained after
suspect asserted right to remain silent inadmissible in case in chief but admissible for impeachment
purposes); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (statements preceded by defective
warnings inadmissible in case in chief but admissible to impeach defendant).
54. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
55. Id. at 342.
56. An agent administered the following warning before questioning Beckwith:
As a special agent, one of my functions is to investigate the possibility of criminal
violations of the Internal Revenue laws, and related offenses.
Under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, I cannot
compel you to answer any questions or to submit any information if such answers or
information might tend to incriminate you in any way. I also advise you that any-
thing which you say and any information which you submit may be used against you
in any criminal proceeding which may be undertaken. I advise you further that you
may, if you wish, seek the assistance of an attorney before responding.
Id. at 348-49 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Defective warnings frequently have been viewed to be constitutionally sufficient. See Duckworth
v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 (1989) (defective warnings constitutional); California v. Prysock,
453 U.S. 355, 361 (1981) (same); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 451 (1974) (same).
57. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 441 (although police failed to advise defendant of his
right to counsel, defendant's statements were not involuntary and thus he was not deprived of his
privilege against self-incrimination).




tion.59 Proponents of this principle trace it to a passage in Miranda in
which the Court required the four well-known warnings "unless we are
shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising ac-
cused persons of their right to silence and in assuring a continuous op-
portunity to exercise it." 60 The IRS agent's warnings to BeckWith were
sufficiently equivalent to Mirada warnings to alert him to his rights.6'
Regrettably, the majority anchored its opinion solely in the generally
noncompelling nature of the encounter. Thus, it ascribed no signifi-
cance to the fact that Beckwith was substantially or at least "construc-
tively" warned. This doctrinal error will be considered fully in Part III,
where Beckwith is reconsidered under a more integrative approach to
custodial interrogation.
In an effort to simplify the test for whether a suspect has suffered a
significant deprivation of freedom, the Court later issued two per cur-
iam opinions that dispelled any suspicion, or hope, that all station-
house questioning is presumptively coercive. In the first, Oregon v.
Mathiason,62 police were investigating an unsolved theft when they hap-
pened upon Mathiason - a parolee and friend of the complainant's
son. After an officer left his card at Mathiason's apartment, Mathiason
dutifully returned the call and arranged to meet the officer at the state
patrol office only two blocks away. 63 Five minutes into the half-hour
"interview" Mathiason confessed after police falsely reported that they
had found his fingerprints at the scene of the crime." Because police
told him he was not under arrest, and the entire encounter spanned
only thirty minutes in a mutually satisfactory locale, the Court reversed
the Oregon Supreme Court's decision to suppress the confession.65 Nei-
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 492 (1981)
(Powell, J., concurring).
59. See Y. KAMiSAR, W. LAPAvE & J. ISRAEL, BASIC CRD"AL PROCEDURE 576-77 (6th ed.
1986) (discussing whether violations of Miranda are necessarily constitutional violations); Public
Safety Exception, supra note 5, at 995-96 and accompanying authorities (same). Because the Court
did not create a "constitutional straightjacket" in Miranda, the Court has suggested in dicta that
states are free to ignore Miranda's strictures. Supra notes 56-58.
60. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 467.
61. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. at 348-49 (Marshall, J., concurring). N
62. 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam).
63. Id. at 493. The officer tried to contact Mathiason several times before leaving his card and
note which read, "I'd like to discuss something with you." Id.
64. Id. The officer advised Mathiason that his honesty could be considered by a judge or
prosecutor should his case progress so far. Id. Police trickery, the Court wrote, "has nothing to
do with whether respondent was in custody for purposes of the Miranda rule." Id. at 495-96.
65. Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that Mathiason's freedom had been deprived in a
significant way. Id. at 496-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also dissented, objecting to
the summary disposition of a case containing the important question of how Mathiason's parolee
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ther his parolee status nor the inherent pressures of a closed-door sta-
tionhouse interrogation sufficed to weight the Court's Miranda analysis
in favor of the cooperative Mathiason.66
If Miranda rights are not necessarily compulsory even on police turf,
Miranda literalists would argue, then they mean less than they once did
and still should. 67 If one is willing to accept a theory of home-field
advantage, then the unsportsmanlike nature of forcing a suspect to
choose a course of action in the backyard of such a formidable rival
as the State cuts against admitting the suspect's confession at trial.6
But such a view ignores that Mathiason was a watered-down version of
stationhouse interrogation. The disparity in coerciveness between Ma-
thiason and Miranda is as vast as that between the IRS cases of
Mathis and Beckwith. The officer's polite business-card introduction,
followed by Mathiason's return phone call and a pre-arranged half-
hour meeting to which Mathiason came unescorted, are a far cry from
the shared "salient features" 69 of the cases that comprised the Miranda
decision. 70 Stationhouse interrogation, traditionally associated with in-
communicado detention and intimidating police tactics, has long been
the triggering point for the warnings requirements. However, despite
status at the time of the interrogation should affect the Court's decision. Id. at 499-500 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). See infra note 89 (discussing subsequent case discounting importance of parolee
status).
66. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 499-500 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing Mathia-
son's parolee status); id. at 497-98 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing inherent pressures).
67. See Kamisar, Tim BURGER COURT, supra note 36, at 84-85 (calling Mathiason "a formalis-
tic, crabbed reading of Miranda").
68. Concepts like home-field advantage arguably reduce justice to values that have more force
in a fox-hunt than in a legal system. Professor Caplan describes his view of the sporting theory
of justice as follows:
[Miranda] accentuated just those features of our system that manifest the least regard
for truthseeking, that imagine the criminal trial as a game of chance in which the
offender should always have some prospect of victory, and that ultimately reflect
doubt on the rectitude of our laws and institutions.
Caplan, supra note 5, at 1419. This truthseeking function, however, is "nowhere mentioned in the
constitutional text and never articulated in the legislative history, as a guide to constitutional adju-
dication." Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified The-
ory of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MIcH. J.L. & REFORM 591, 593 (1990).
69. Supra note 35.
70. Miranda never said that an unwarned suspect cannot confess at the stationhouse. The
Court meant to admit not only confessions obtained through general on-the-scene questioning, see
supra note 33 and accompanying text, but also from "a person who enters a police station and
states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confes-
sion .... Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 478 (footnote omitted). Mathiason fell under neither
category; his confession was police-initiated. Whether he was in custodial interrogation, however,
is not so clear.
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the inherent proof problems endemic to stationhouse events, there is no
reason why a noncoercive stationhouse meeting should automatically
yield inadmissible evidence based solely on its locale. 71 As a result, Ma-
thiason is a close case, occurring in a presumptively coercive setting
under arguably uncoercive circumstances.
As close as it may be, Mathiason depicts the Court's fidelity to Mir-
anda's facts but not its holding. The Mathiason Court announced its
unconditional intent to give significant deprivations of freedom a re-
strictive meaning. It recognized that "[a]ny interview of one suspected
of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, '"72 but
those coercive aspects would not rise to the level of a significant depri-
vation of freedom. "[Police officers," the Court continued, "are not
required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they ques-
tion. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because
the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the ques-
tioned person is one whom the police suspect. ' 73 In an attempt to give
content to this statement, the Court, rather than delineate who deserves
Miranda warnings, explained who does not.74 The ill-fated Mathiason
fell into the latter category.
Definitions stated in the negative are inherently imprecise. In most
cases, they cannot, at least in their incipient stages, specifically exclude
enough to be of much use." In its next breath, the Court attempted an
affirmative definition, but did so in bare, conclusory language. Mir-
anda warnings, said the Court, "are required only where there has
been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in cus-
tody.' ' 76 With this tautology, the Court broke new ground in Miranda
analysis, collapsing the separate concepts of custody and significant
deprivations of freedom.
Reducing significant deprivations to "custody" or its functional
equivalent says nothing about which deprivations would merit this ele-
vated status. What is the functional equivalent of custody? Does it in-
volve a greater degree of compulsion than a reasonable suspect's
71. Some, however, have suggested a per se ban of all unwarned statements obtained at the
stationhouse. Graham, supra note 10, at 82-83; Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 69;
Smith, supra note 5, at 723.
72. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Courts decide only the cases before them and should not hypothesize about future litiga-
tion, but when dealing with definitions, especially definitions that have proven to be uncertain, an
eye toward prospective application should lead courts to clarify fuzzy concepts whenever possible.
76. Id.
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perception that he or she is not free to go? Does it require a particular
length or degree of restraint or intrusiveness of questioning?
Notwithstanding the looseness of the definition, the Court's intention
must have been to narrow suspects' protections under Miranda, which
clearly separated custody from significant deprivations. To say these
concepts are the same is to blur a distinction designed to establish a
class of police-suspect encounters that would fall short of actual cus-
tody but still command Miranda warnings. 7 This definitional merger
would seem to limit the circumstances that could qualify as significant
deprivations of freedom. As grim as this conflation of custody and sig-
nificant deprivations may be, without more meat on this bare-bones
definition there is no way to tell which encounters meet the definition
and which do not. 78
Six years later in California v. Beheler,79 the Court rendered the sec-
ond of two theoretically linked per curiam opinions. Beheler's case
arose ostensibly out of his sense of civic duty. He called police to re-
port that a woman from whom he and others had tried to steal hash-
ish had been fatally shot, and that his confederates had buried the
murder weapon in Beheler's backyard.80 After a consent search of the
yard uncovered the weapon, Beheler acquiesced to officers' suggestion
that he accompany them to the stationhouse for questioning.8' Police
advised him that he was not under arrest,12 then obtained his confes-
sion during a half-hour "interview." 3 Five days later police arrested
and warned Beheler, who waived his rights and again confessed, vow-
ing that his previous confession was voluntary.84
Beheler contains three pertinent propositions."5 First, it emphasizes
that while Mathiason went under his own power to the police station
77. Cf. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 436-37 (declining to establish class of restraint that
qualifies as seizure for fourth amendment purposes but not as significant deprivation for fifth
amendment purposes).
78. Eight years after Mathiason, Justice Brennan wrote that there really is no riddle in the
overwhelming number of cases. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 359 & n.4l (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MicH. L. REv. 865, 879 (1981)).
79. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per curiam).
80. Id. at 1122.
81. Id.
82. Id. Both here and in Mathiason, just how important this admonition was to the Court's
holding is unclear. A "you are not under arrest" admonition says nothing of the consequences of
that condition, nor does it seem to place any limits on police conduct. An officer could utter the
admonition, then proceed with impunity to subject the suspect to coercive interrogation tactics.
83. Beheler confessed to being at the scene of the crime when his half-brother, Dannie Will-
banks, fatally shot Peggy Dean in the parking lot of a liquor store. People v. Beheler, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 195, 196-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
84. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1122.
85. Beheler also raised an unsuccessful "independent state ground" argument. Id. at 1123 n.l;
id. at 1126-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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and Beheler accompanied police, Beheler's ordeal, although somewhat
more compelling than Mathiason's, was still outside Miranda.6 Second,
Beheler parrots Mathiason's notion of significant deprivations of free-
dom.8 7 In these two respects the case is unspectacular. The final propo-
sition, however, is noteworthy. In an effort to make the flinty
significant deprivations inquiry more manageable, the Court down-
played the dissenting justices' juxtaposition of facts surrounding the in-
terrogations of Mathiason and Beheler. 8s For instance, the Court
excluded many possibly relevant factors from its decision whether to
protect a suspect under Miranda: whether the period from committing
the crime to arrest is short (several hours in Beheler) or long (three
weeks in Mathiason); whether the suspect is drunk and vulnerable (Be-
heler) or sober (Mathiason); and whether the suspect is a parolee (Ma-
thiason) or is not (Beheler).8 9 Perhaps interested in developing a finite
list of in-custody factors, the Court, as in Mathiason, eliminated from
consideration numerous potentially relevant facts from a necessarily
fact-based judgment about the level of constraint.
D. The Later Cases
The cases that followed Beheler became increasingly complex. Since
the early cases, the Court has continually upheld convictions that rested
on incriminating statements or the fruits thereof. Unlike the middle-
years' cases, however, which merged custody and significant depriva-
tions, the later cases are viewed as exceptions to the Miranda doc-
86. Id. at 1125.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1124-25.
89. In its next term, the Court dispelled Justice Stevens's concerns about Mathiason's parolee
status. See supra note 65 (discussing Justice Stevens's dissent which objected to summary disposi-
tion of issue of Mathiason's parolee status). In Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984), Mur-
phy had confessed first to a treatment counselor and then to his probation officer. The Court, in
turn, reversed the state court's suppression of his confession because the noncustodial, interview-
like setting required that Murphy claim the otherwise self-executing fifth amendment privilege. Id.
at 433. Since the parolee-probation officer dynamic is remote from and thus not fairly comparable
to the police-suspect dynamic, I have excluded it from textual consideration. The custodial level is
typically so low that only a high-intensity interrogation could make Miranda relevant to parolee-
probation officer settings.
Absent high-intensity questioning, Murphy may be more properly juxtaposed to the pressures on
a grand jury witness or an ordinary trial witness, both of whom must claim the privilege. Al-
though the case does refer to the Mathiason-Beheler standard, id. at 430-31, the comparatively
familiar, nonrestrictive nature of these encounters is likely a less-than-significant deprivation of
freedom. Of course, this conclusion rests, as did the Court's, on the assumption that Murphy was
not prompted to incriminate himself by the fear that his silence would result in the revocation of
his parole. Id. at 433 & n.6.
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trine. 90 After the middle years, only one decision - Berkemer v.
McCarty9) ' - confronts the admissibility consequences of confessions
obtained from a suspect whose freedom has been deprived in any sig-
nificant way.
In Berkemer, the Court granted certiorari to clarify Miranda's appli-
cability to interrogations involving minor offenses, and to the question-
ing of motorists pursuant to routine traffic stops.92 Berkerner shows the
Court in a unique posture. In many of its holdings in the area of con-
stitutional criminal procedure, the Court has pronounced broad rules
seemingly fashioned to protect the rights of an accused who challenged
the admissibility of his confession, then subjected the accused to a nar-
row application of the rule formulated precisely for his benefit.93 Here,
however, the Court went out of its way to trim suspects' protections in
certain settings, but upheld the reversal of McCarty's conviction.
McCarty encountered police while swerving down an Ohio interstate
highway. After a trooper pulled him over and, without issuing warn-
ings, asked a few questions about his level of sobriety, McCarty gave
incriminating answers, then flunked a roadside balancing test.94 The of-
90. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312 (second confession preceded by Miranda warnings
and valid waiver not excludable as "fruit" of earlier Miranda violation unless earlier violation
extracted by "physical violence or other deliberate means to break the suspect's will"); New York
v. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658 n.7 (absent "actual coercion," need for answers to questions in situa-
tion posing threat to public safety outweighs need for prophylactic rule protecting privilege).
91. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
92. Id. at 422-23. This is how Justice Marshall framed the issue in his opinion for the unani-
mous Court. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurring opinion, however, the questiotifpre-
sented in the petition for certiorari was much narrower. Infra note 97.
93. As with the ultimate outcome in Miranda's travails on remand, see L. BAKER, supra note
2, at 9-12, 408-09, the Court's decisions often are more meaningful for posterity than for those
whose circumstances led to the breakthrough decisions. Like Ernesto Miranda, the prison gates did
not automatically swing open for the three defendants who successfully appealed their convictions
in companion cases heard in conjunction with Miranda. Miranda v. Arizona .(No. 759). Michael
Vignera pleaded guilty to a lesser charge, received seven to ten years, and was released only be-
cause the trial court credited him for time served. Vignera v. New York (No. 760). Carl Calvin
Westover was tried again and convicted. Westover v. United States (No. 761). Roy Allen Stewart's
litigation dragged on for years, ending in reconviction for first-degree murder and robbery. Cali-
fornia v. Stewart (No. 584). L. BAKER, supra note 2, at 191-92; see W. MURPHY & C. PprrcHETr,
CoURaS, JuDon, & PoLmcs 329 (4th ed. 1986) ("[s]everal studies have shown that less than half
of those people who won in the Supreme Court but whose cases required further litigation in state
courts actually won when the final decision was reached"). In addition, defendants in the key
decisions Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (all questioning must cease once suspect in-
vokes right to counsel unless suspect initiates communication), and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387 (1977) (officer's "Christian burial speech," an emotional appeal to suspect's conscience, vio-
lated sixth amendment right to counsel), obtained short-lived victories in the Supreme Court de-
spite having been the glad recipients of judicial rulemaking designed to prevent police from
committing future constitutional errors.
94. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 423. He told the officer he had just drank two beers
and had smoked several joints. This may have explained why he fell down during the balancing
test. Id.
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ficer arrested and took McCarty downtown, where he further incrimi-
nated himself in response to additional questioning, again without the
benefit of Miranda warnings.'5 After pleading no contest to drunk driv-
ing, McCarty sought post-conviction relief in the Ohio courts and on
habeas corpus until obtaining his writ from the Sixth Circuit. Unsatis-
fied with the Sixth Circuit's failure to clearly delineate whether the pre-
arrest statements would be admissible on retrial, 6 the Court bifurcated
its analysis into a consideration of McCarty's pre- and post-arrest state-
ments. The latter clearly were inadmissible under any view of Miranda.
The former, however, were another story. 97
The Court first rejected the State's suggestion that the Court carve
out an exception to Miranda in cases involving misdemeanor traffic of-
fenses. 98 The Court also expressly declined to cure the Ohio trial
court's admission of the post-arrest statements through harmless error
analysis." Sandwiched between these gestures of fidelity to Miranda
was a presumption of admissibility for the brief, pre-arrest, Terry-
like, ° public questioning of motorists. The key to the opinion rests in
the distinction between traffic stops - a familiar police-citizen ritual -
and the impermissible types of compelling influences at work in Mir-
anda.
95. Id. Berkemer "guessed" he was "barely" under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 424.
96. Id. at 425-26 (citing McCarty v. Herdman, 716 F.2d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 1983)),
97. Justice Stevens chastised his colleagues for rewriting the petition for certiorari to suit their
interests, which in this case were broader than the issue presented to the Court. Only the applica-
bility of Miranda to misdemeanor traffic offenses was ripe for review, said Justice Stevens, not
the question of whether roadside questioning pursuant to a traffic stop constitutes custodial inter-
rogation. Berkemer v. McCarty 468 U.S. at 445-46 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). The Court could have answered the first question without the second, but the
existence of both pre- and post-arrest statements necessitated a judicial inquiry that went beyond
Justice Stevens's and the Sixth Circuit's approach. While good arguments support both sides on
the outcome of this case, it is difficult to fault the Court for fleshing out the more difficult issue
that drove the entire litigation. Furthermore, the Supreme Court rules permit as much:
The statement of a question presented will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary
question fairly included therein. Only the questions set forth in the petition or fairly
included therein will be considered by the Court.
SOp. CT. RU=E 21.1.(a) (1990).
98. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 429. Citing chapter and verse of Miranda, the Court
emphasized the need to respect the "'simplicity and clarity' of Miranda, and to recognize the
"'inherently compelling pressures.' of the custodial setting which 'undermine the individual's will
to resist."' Id. at 432-33 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 467). In the next section of its
opinion, the Court imposed its own limits on those areas of the Miranda doctrine that are neither
simple nor clear. Id. at 435-42.
99. Id. at 443-45.
100. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (fourth amendment permits an officer to detain
person briefly for questioning and pat-down search on reasonable suspicion of involvement in
criminal activity).
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The unanimous decision in Berkemer, authored by Justice Marshall,
shows an unusual solidarity among the justices in the custodial interro-
gation arena. Because the Court had settled some years earlier that a
brief automobile detention is a "seizure" within the meaning of the
fourth amendment, the justices declined to hold that a person may be
seized in a fourth amendment sense, yet may not be significantly de-
prived of his freedom for fifth amendment purposes.' 0' The Court thus
announced that not all significant deprivations of freedom are subject
to the strictures of Miranda.10 2 By potentially stripping from Miranda's
ambit all significant deprivations of freedom short of actual custody or
those that lack sufficient factual identity with Miranda,'13 the Court
went further than necessary to achieve its desired result.
The Court instead could have reached the same result had it classi-
fied the restraint on McCarty as "insignificant." In fact, the Court
supplied the rationale for this very conclusion. First, the customary
brevity of traffic stops alerts drivers that the flashing lights in their
rear-view mirrors will cause them only temporary inconvenience.Y0 The
brevity and spontaneity of traffic stops mitigate the possibility that po-
lice will have the time to engage in trickery carefully planned to elicit
confessions. 05 Second, detained motorists usually are confronted by
only one or two officers in a somewhat public setting. As a result,
101. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 436-37 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653
(1979)); infra note 111.
102. According to the Court:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the
"freedom of action" of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained vehi-
cle .... Certainly few motorists would feel free either to disobey a directive to pull
over or to. leave the scene of a traffic stop without being told they might do so....
However, ,we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda
opinion emphasized by [McCarty). Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda re-
quires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the
concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a
traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that significantly impair his free
exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his
constitutional rights.
Id. at 436-37. Significant deprivations of freedom had been supplanted by "sufficient ... im-
pair[ments] [of the suspect's] free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination .... ." Id. at
437.
103. Id.; cf. C. WsrmBREaD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIaNAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CAssS
AN'D CoNcEpTs § 16.05, at 369 (2d ed. 1986) (Miranda triggered only by interrogations conducted
in atmosphere "akin to arrest," which is determined by "purpose, location, and length of deten-
tion").
104. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 437-38.
105. Id. at 438 n.27.
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motorists arguably do not feel "completely at the mercy of police,"' 1 6
as did the suspects in the early Miranda cases.' 7
At this point, the Court likened traffic stops to Terry stops, which
permit officers on reasonable suspicion short of probable cause to con-
firm or dispel their suspicion through a few questions and a pat-down
search.108 If Terry stops exceed the grasp of Miranda, reasoned the
Court, then so should their roadside analogues.109 Brief, public ques-
106. Id. at 438. The Court's reliance on citizens' familiarity with traffic stops and its perception
of citizens' expectations in those settings may assume too much. Do citizens really believe ques-
tioning will be brief? Furthermore, duration of questioning in traffic stops is in many instances an
unreliable index to coercion. Officers could ask many questions, all of them innocuous, thus add-
ing nothing coercive to the encounter. Similarly, the right question asked at the right time by the
right officer could create a coercive environment in a matter of seconds.
107. Id. at 439 n.28. According to the Court, Orozco and Mathis were archetypically police-
dominated settings of custodial interrogation. Recall, however, that Orozco involved brief bedroom
questioning, not patently distinguishable from brief roadside questioning. Orozco v. Texas, 394
U.S. at 325.
108. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 27.
109. Because Terry permits officers to ask an undefined set of pertinent questions in order to
confirm or dispel their suspicions that "criminal activity may be afoot," Terry's questioning com-
ponent overlaps with Miranda. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 30. The Terry Court gave this strand
of questioning the watered-down label "field interrogation," apparently not to be confused with
"custodial interrogation." Id. at 1, 11, 19 & nn. 16 & 34. Unless courts carefully limit question-
ing-under Terry, police may lawfully manipulate a valid Terry stop to obtain testimonial evidence.
See also United States v. Brady, 819 F.2d 884, 887 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[qluestioning can be
more intrusive than a search because it can evoke an incriminating response in a situation where a
lawful search would uncover nothing"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988).
For the few who have travelled between these two cases, the trek has been brief, usually ending
in tautology: Terry stops are not subject to the strictures of Miranda because the former are not
settings of custodial interrogation. Consequently, police avoidance and abuse of Miranda under
the guise of Terry will continue to conflate an otherwise bright line between the fourth and fifth
amendments. So long as officers seek testimonial evidence, their actions must be governed by the
fifth amendment. Questioning is a fifth amendment tool for eliciting testimonial evidence; searches,
in turn, are a fourth amendment vehicle for obtaining tangible evidence. Once an officer opens
his or her mouth, the words uttered must satisfy Miranda, not Terry. This is not to say that the
government cannot seek testimonial evidence through means other than questioning without impli-
cating the fifth amendment. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-512 (1961)
(admissibility of testimony obtained through electronic listening device is guided by fourth amend-
ment). It means only that police cannot interrogate the suspect without regard for Miranda.
Professor LaFave looked at Miranda in the Terry setting, and advised that Miranda's reference
to the "potentiality for compulsion" be the benchmark:
mhe only distinction to be made is between those instances in which a general in-
quiry (for example, "What happened?") is made to witnesses, and those in which an
individual is called on to inculpate or exculpate himself (for example, "What are you
doing here?" or "Where did you get that property?"). In the latter instances the
warnings should be required whether or not there is "custody," a "seizure," or an
"arrest."
LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MicI.
L. REv. 40, 100 (1969). By not requiring "custody, a seizure, or an arrest," Professor LaFave's
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tioning precluding one or two officers from trickery in a non-threaten-
ing setting that insulates suspects from feeling "at the mercy of
police," the Court wrote, is outside the purview of Miranda.110
Despite its arsenal of mitigating factors, the Court bypassed the
chance to hold simply that brief traffic stops constitute an insignificant
deprivation of freedom. To so hold, the Court would have been re-
quired to reason that a fourth amendment "seizure" is not always a
fifth amendment "significant deprivation of freedom." This interpreta-
tion would have been tricky,"' but preferable to the Court's creation
of a presumption of non-coercion, rebuttable only by evidence of ac-
tual arrest or its functional equivalent." 2 Identifying the point at which
police behavior becomes the functional equivalent of arrest is admit-
tedly difficult for the Court. Nevertheless, the Court believed that this
approach was the only alternative to an over- or under-protective appli-
cation of Miranda."3 The Court failed to mention, however, that the
prosecution had argued this point unsuccessfully in Miranda."4
reading of Miranda was broader than the Court's. Since then only Professor Dix has attempted
seriously to add contemporary flavor to LaFave's study. See Dix, Nonarrest Investigatory Deten-
tions in Search and Seizure Law, 1985 DuKE L.J. 849, 945-51 (some police-suspect encounters
demand modified warnings sufficient to alert suspects to rights, but not so rigid to hamstring
police in noncoercive settings); cf. Mongiardo, The Terry Exception to Miranda, 10 SEAncH AD
SEIZURE LAw REPORT 165 (1983) (pre-Quarles discussion of emergency-based exception to Mir-
anda); Comment, Miranda Rights in a Terry Stop: The Implications of People v. Johnson, 63
DEN. U. L. REv. 109, 110 (1985) (pronounced distinction lies between Terry and Miranda).
110. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 438.
Ill. The Court's definition of "seizure" sounds a lot like that of custody: "[A) person has
been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circum-
stances surrounding the incident, a reasoriable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (footnote omitted).
112. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 440 (citations omitted).
113. The Court regretted the all-or-none dilemma that Miranda posed in traffic stops. If Mir-
anda were applicable in all stops, argued the Court, it would impede the enforcement of traffic
laws while doing little to protect suspects' fifth amendment rights. Insulating all traffic stops from
Miranda, on the other hand, would give police license to circumvent the clear dictates of Mir-
anda. Id. at 441.
114. The Court in Miranda said:
A recurrent argument made in these cases is that society's need for interrogation
outweighs the privilege. This argument is not unfamiliar to our Court. The whole
thrust of our foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Constitution has prescribed
the rights of the individual when confronted with the power of government when it
provided in the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to be a
witness against himself. That right cannot be abridged.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 479.
Ultimately, however, the Court left undisturbed the Sixth Circuit's issuance of Berkemer's writ
of habeas corpus. For two reasons, the Court refused to subject to harmless error analysis the
Ohio trial court's admission of Berkemer's post-arrest statements. First, those statements were
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E. Summary
Significant deprivations of freedom have endured a convoluted his-
tory in the Supreme Court. At the outset, the Court read the concept
literally, evidenced by Justice Black's terse opinions in the early cases,
which applied Miranda to non-stationhouse settings. Of the significant
cases of the middle years, only one, Beckwith, retained Miranda's orig-
inal understanding of significant deprivations. In other decisions of this
period, the Court made euphemistic references to half-hour "inter-
views," which until then had been called "interrogations." Those cases
treated significant deprivations and custody, although clearly distinct in
Miranda, as functionally identical. Regrettably, the Court did not de-
fine "the functional equivalent of arrest." Thus, these middle-years
cases offer conclusive authority on what is not a significant depriva-
tion, but are uninstructive as to what one is.
The most recent decision in this area may bode more favorably for
the suspect than for subsequent motorists similarly situated. Berkemer
began by trimming suspects' protection with the overzealous declaration
that not all significant deprivations of freedom deserve Miranda's safe-
more incriminating than those he made at roadside. Only after being arrested did McCarty admit
to being under the influence of an intoxicant, an essential element of the crime for which he was
convicted. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 443-44. This fact took on added importance when
considered in light of his breathalyzer test, which evaluated McCarty as legally sober. Id. at 444.
Second, his no-contest plea, motivated in part by his knowledge that all his statements would be
admitted at trial, foreclosed him from adducing his own or challenging the state's evidence. A
jury, reasoned the Court, may have been interested in hearing McCarty's arguments. For instance,
his performance on the balancing test was allegedly attributable to a back injury. Id. In short, the
Court presumed that McCarty's decision as to how to proceed might have been different had the
judge decided at the suppression hearing to admit only the pre-arrest statements at trial. Id. This
ruling much more closely than usual reflects the cautious inquiry that harmless error analysis
properly commands.
Harmless error is "the notion that a criminal conviction need not be reversed even though mis-
takes of law or procedure were admittedly made at the trial." Allen, A Serendipitous Trek
Through the Advance-Sheet Jungle: Criminal Justice in the Courts of Review, 70 IowA L. Rv.
311, 329 (1984). The principle is traceable to Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), which
established that errors leading to a finding of guilt can avoid reversal only if they are harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. The problem is the justices' flexible understanding of reasonable
doubt. One member of the Court has cautioned that
[aln automatic application of harmless error review in case after case, and for error
after error, can only encourage prosecutors to subordinate the interest in respecting
the Constitution to the ever present and always powerful interest in obtaining a con-
viction in a particular case. It is particularly striking to compare the Court's appar-
ent willingness to forgive constitutional errors that redound to the prosecutor's
benefit with the Court's determination to give conclusive effect to trivial errors that
obstruct a defendant's ability to raise meritorious constitutional arguments.
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 588-89 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (footnotes
omitted).
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guards; however, it upheld the lower court's reversal of McCarty's con-
viction. Announced as either an exception to or a partial overruling of
the significant deprivations language, Berkemer is exotic. The possibility
exists, however, that the Court's depreciation of significant deprivations
of freedom will re-emerge in another setting, and further restrict the
application of Miranda to police-suspect encounters.
Read together, the relevant cases stand for the proposition that Mir-
anda attaches in any setting of custody or its amorphous functional
equivalent. The Court, though, has given with one hand and taken
away with the other. It has been generous with locale, but strict on the
threshold level of compulsion necessary to trigger Miranda. Given the
Court's stated belief that Miranda was designed to curb the practices
endemic to stationhouse interrogation, the temptation seems strong to
hold police to a lower standard of care in non-stationhouse settings,
perhaps even a sliding scale - sliding according to the suspect's level
of familiarity with his surroundings. Miranda, however, contemplated
no such distinction. Before proposing an alternative method of custo-
dial interrogation analysis, this Article first analyzes the interrogation
prong of the Court's two-step inquiry.
II. INTERROGATION
A. Background
Since Chief Justice Warren's bare observation in Miranda that "in-
terrogation" means "questioning initiated by law enforcement offi-
cers," ' the Court has tried to add content to that term. Other
passages in Miranda, each confirmed by subsequent decisions, belie
any intent to construe the concept so simply."6 The Court looks for
115. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444.
116. Several of the Court's concerns about the coercive effect of the "interrogation environ-
ment" on a suspect's will, see id. at 457-58, did not include express questioning. For example,
coached witnesses would "identify" the suspect in a lineup in order to infuse the interrogation
with the air of presumed guilt. Id. at 453. False accusations for fictitious crimes, directed to elicit
a confession to the crime for which police suspected the suspect, were also addressed in Miranda.
Id. Finally, the Court recognized that "psychological ploys," which imputed guilt, soft-pedaled the
seriousness of the offense, and shifted blame to the victim or to society, were viewed as tanta-
mount to interrogation. Id. at 450; Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 526 (1987); Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. at 299; Y. KAmis.A, KAWsAR EssAYs, supra note 15, at 152-53. The idea that
police conduct other than express questioning can lead to the exclusion of a confession is an old
one. From Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 539 (1897) (suspect confessed when told that co-
suspect had "fingered him"), to Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 151 (1944) (suspect con-
fessed when confession of contract killer read to him), to Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 482-
83 (1964) (suspect "cracked" when confronted with alleged accomplice who said Escobedo was
trigger man), the Court has repeatedly struck down confessions despite the absence of express
questioning. Miranda meant to stop practices that "exert[ed] a tug on the suspect to confess,"
previously allowable under due process precedents, regardless of what form they take. Y. KAMI-
sR, KAmdsAR EssAys, supra note 15, at 155.
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constructive questioning as well, including within "interrogation" the
"functional equivalent of express questioning." 17 Given its difficulties
in defining the "functional equivalent of custody," it is unsurprising
that the Court has focused on the "functional equivalent" part of the
phrase, and has resisted defining "express questioning." The Court
has recognized that some express questioning is not guided by Mir-
anda, particularly "[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to facts sur-
rounding a crime,""18 or questioning that is part of the charging and
booking process." 9 As a result, express questioning is viewed as either
clearly within or beyond Miranda; the close cases involving express
questioning for some reason have escaped Supreme Court review. 20 In
fact, interrogation cases in general have received only limited play in
the Supreme Court.1 2' And even then, the Court's penchant for
117. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301; see 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 27, §
6.7, at 501. The words "questioning" and "interrogation" are better viewed as interpretive con-
structs than as conceptual straightjackets. Rather than be constrained by the term "interrogation,"
Professor Kamisar has referred to the concept as "compulsion within the meaning of the privi-
lege." Y. KAmKsA AR EssAYs, supra note 15, at 158-60.
118. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 477.
119. Last term the Court announced a "routine booking question" exception for "biographical
data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services." Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638,
2650 (1990) (citation omitted). Questions about a drunk driver's "name, address, height, weight,
eye color, date of birth, and current age" fall within the exception. Id. After considering whether
quizzing the suspect about the year of his sixth birthday asked for physiological rather than testi-
monial evidence under Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (privilege does not pro-
tect suspect against compulsion to produce "real or physical evidence"), the Court held that it did
not, and excluded the videotaped response to the illegal question on Miranda grounds. Justices
White, Blackmun, and Stevens agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist, who insisted that the sup-
pressed answer was non-testimonial, although it involved "the use of the human voice." Pennsyl-
vania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2653 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the result
in part, and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall had tired of the Court's exceptions, and would
have suppressed the entire videotaped questioning. Id. at 2654-58 (Marshall, J., concurring in part,
and dissenting in part).
Other permissible questioning includes questions asked for purpose of identification outside the
booking process, such as street encounters involving innocuous questions like "what happened?"
or "what's going on here?" that may lead to surprise results. Clearly, Quarles-type questions are
immunized, as is some questioning incident to arrest and to the execution of a search warrant. 1
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMNAL PROCEDURE § 6.7, at 504-06 (1984 & Supp. 1989). Although
typically brief, street encounters quickly can escalate into settings of police abuse. Nonetheless,
they are infrequently challenged, and none has reached the Supreme Court on the interrogation
issue.
120. Express questioning is tested frequently in state courts. See generally D. NissmN, E.
HAGEN & P. BROOKS, LAW OF ConEssIoNs §§ 5.7-5.15, at 129-44 (1985 & Supp. 1989) and cases
cited therein; 1 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 119, at § 6.7 (1984 & Supp. 1989) and cases
cited therein.
121. The dearth of interrogation cases in the Supreme Court is not for lack of opportunity.
See, e.g., Lewis v. Florida, 486 U.S. 1036, 1037 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). There, after the suspect was warned and claimed his right to silence, officers took him
to a room and showed him a videotape of the robbery-murder he had committed. During the
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"waiver" 1 22 and "initiation"'1 23 questions has subordinated the thresh-
old question of whether police interrogated a suspect in favor of
whether the suspect subsequently, by his own initiative, rid police
conduct of exclusionary consequences.
viewing, the suspect made incriminating statements, which he later tried without success to sup-
press in the Florida courts. Justice White framed the issue as "[w]hether police may confront a
suspect with evidence against him, outside the range of normal arrest and charging procedures,
without engaging in the 'functional equivalent' of interrogation .... "Id. (White, J., dissenting).
122. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Court has been busy rendering sharply divided decisions that
seem unmindful of the "heavy burden" on officials to demonstrate that a suspect's waiver was
"voluntary, knowing, and intelligent." See, e.g., Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-92 (1988)
(defendant never indicated that he wanted assistance of counsel); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S.
564, 573-74 (1987) (waivers are voluntary absent evidence of police coercion); Connecticut v. Bar-
rett, 479 U.S. 523, 527-29 (1987) (waiver was voluntary where there was no evidence that defen-
dant was threatened, tricked or cajoled); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (no
evidence of coercive police activity so mentally retarded suspect's waiver was voluntary). But see
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 685-87 (1988) (once defendant has requested representation,
subsequent waiver during questioning for separate investigation is presumptively coerced).
The same can be seen in the Court's selection and denial of petitions for certiorari. In Hender-
son v. Florida, 473 U.S. 916 (1985), the Court denied certiorari to a suspect-petitioner who had
invoked his right to counsel, then, after a five-hour drive in the back of a squad car, agreed to
sign a waiver form. He waived after police, who said the suspect had a "look on his face"
indicating "his conscience was bothering him," asked him "if there was anything he would like to
tell the[ml." Id. at 917-18 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Marshall
rejected the conclusion of the Florida courts that the suspect's "subtle hints" constituted "initia-
tion" within the meaning of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Henderson v. Florida, 473
U.S. at 919 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Watkins v. Virginia, 475 U.S.
1099, 1100-02 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (after invoking right to
counsel, petitioner was not furnished attorney but nonetheless held by Virginia courts to have
validly waived his rights by confessing after repeated warnings and "nagging" led him to sign
waiver form).
123. In 1981, the Court purported to guarantee that police honor a suspect's decision to deal
with the authorities only through a lawyer. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (accused
who has requested counsel cannot be subject to custodial interrogation unless and until accused
initiates further discussion relating to investigation and validly waives right to counsel). Edwards
has been interpreted in conjunction with Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), holding that
once a suspect asserts his right to cut off questioning, that is, asserts his right to silence, police
may "scrupulously honor" that right by "immediately ceas[ing] the interrogation, resum[ing] ques-
tioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of
warnings, and restrict~ingI the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the
earlier interrogation." Id. at 106. After Edwards, however, Justice White's concurring opinion in
Mosley, arguing that the right to silence carries less protection than the right to counsel, id. at
109-11 (White, J., concurring in the result), became necessary to the Court's holding in Arizona
v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 685-87 (1988). There, the Court held that Edwards bars police-initi-
ated interrogation (preceded by warnings) following a suspect's request for counsel in the context
of a separate investigation. Apparently, suspects, presumed to be too unsophisticated to deal with
authorities without the guiding hand of counsel, must know that there are serious consequences
riding on their choice of which right (silence or counsel) they claim. A recent decision may have
confirmed that the rights to silence and counsel are afforded different legal significance. See Min-
nick v. Mississippi, III S. Ct. 486, 490-91 (1990) (invalidating state practice that allowed interro-
gation after suspect had opportunity to consult with attorney).
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
The Court's failure to appreciate the complex relationship between
custody and interrogation demeans the combined effect of these two
aspects of police restraint. Only by viewing interrogation techniques
through the prism of custody can the effect of police restraint upon a
suspect begin to be measured. A look at the cases that attempt to set
the boundaries of interrogation reveals the Court's myopic tendency to
focus on only one aspect of restraint - either custody or interrogation
- and thus to ignore the augmented impact that these compelling ele-
ments, operating together, exert on a suspect. To some extent the
Court's myopia may be blamed on the phrasing of questions preserved
for review in petitions for certiorari. But that phrasing should not, ac-
cording to the Supreme Court Rules,' preclude the Court from an-
swering other questions necessary to properly address the questions
raised by the petitioner.
B. The Sixth Amendment Cases
The Court discusses "interrogation" in both fifth and sixth amend-
ment cases. For two reasons, however, the sixth amendment cases offer
little guidance as to the meaning of the term in the fifth amendment
context. First, the Court interprets the rights under the sixth amend-
ment to be more powerful. Second, the language of the two amend-
ments is different; the sixth amendment refers to assistance of counsel
in criminal proceedings while the fifth amendment speaks of compul-
sion.
Once formal proceedings in the form of indictment, information, or
arraignment have commenced against an individual, the fifth amend-
ment gives way to the sixth amendment, where, for better or worse,
the Court reads the Constitution to circumscribe police practices more
closely than with the fifth amendment. This "formalistic' 12 triggering
point is most commonly associated with Brewer v. Williams,126 which
124. The pertinent rule on petitions for certiorari states:
The statement of a question presented will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary
question fairly included within. Only the questions set forth in the petition or fairly
included therein will be considered by the Court.
SuP. CT. R. 21.1.(a) (1990).
125. See Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 Omo ST.
L.J. 449, 490-91 (1964) (commenting that in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), Justice
Stewart's dissenting opinion that there was no right to counsel prior to indictment was based on
"highly formalistic reading of the sixth amendment").
126. 430 U.S. 387 (1977); see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431 (1986) ("[T]he Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not attach until after the initiation of formal charges."); Maine
v. Moulton, 464 U.S. 159, 170 (1985) (initiation of adversary judicial proceedings is fundamental
to proper application of sixth amendment right to counsel).
1991)
AMERIcAN CRInNAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:1
borrowed the doctrine from a then-dormant precedent, Massiah v.
United States.2 7 Massiah held that once the state initiates formal pro-
ceedings against a defendant, the sixth amendment protects him from
extrajudicial, police-orchestrated proceedings designed to "deliberately
elicit" incriminating statements in the absence of counsel.128 The fifth
amendment, on the other hand, applies only to encounters occurring
before formal proceedings have begun.
Despite this clear line between the two amendments, the Court is un-
sure whether "interrogation" is relevant to sixth amendment cases. In
Brewer, for instance, both the majority and the four dissenters tested
the officer's statements under their understanding of "interrogation,' '1 29
perhaps because of a passage in Massiah stating that the sixth amend-
ment "must apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations," particu-
larly to an accused like Massiah, who "did not even know that he was
under interrogation by a government agent."' 30 That Massiah was sur-
reptitiously interrogated and Williams was not made no difference, to
the Court, 3' which interpreted the Massiah rule as: "[Olnce adversary
127. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Massiah had been indicted and released on bail following his not-
guilty plea to federal narcotics charges. The Court held that the police, by obtaining damning
admissions from Massiah through electronically eavesdropping on a conversation they had staged
between him and co-defendant Colson, violated Massiah's sixth amendment right to counsel. Al-
though Massiah was under no formal compulsion to speak, the Court relied heavily on the fact
that formal proceedings (in'that case, an indictment) had been initiated against him. Indictment, a
critical stage in the proceedings against Massiah, "clearly entitled [him] to a lawyer's help" before
facing the adversarial test of an orderly, open, judicially-sponsored trial. Id. at 204.
128. Id. at 206.
129. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 399-401, 419-20, 438-40.
130. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at 206 (quoting United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62,
72-73 (2d Cir. 1962)).
131. Any notion that Massiah stood for the proposition that the sixth amendment erects a con-
stitutional barrier to governmental deceit seems to have been foreclosed by Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). Hoffa could not successfully claim that his incriminating statements
to a "friend"-informer were coerced, even though the informer had "worm[ed] his way into Hof-
fa's ... entourage." Id. at 319 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Hoffa illustrates how Massiah and
Miranda direct the same interrogation scenario to different outcomes. Unlike a Massiah-type case,
in which the sixth amendment is triggered by formal proceedings followed by deliberate elicitations
but not by police pressure, Hoffa, a pre-formal proceedings case, demonstrates that in a fifth
amendment analysis, in which compulsion is the index to admissibility, a suspect's "rel[iance]
upon his misplaced confidence that [the plant] would not reveal his wrongdoing" is bad luck, not
compulsion. Id. at 302. See Y. KAms rsAl, KAmISAR ESSAYS, supra note 15, at 143 ("[blecause
Hoffa did not know that his court retainer was a secret government agent, he could not claim
that his incriminating statements were the product of legal or factual coercion") (footnotes omit-
ted); 1 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 27, § 6.7, at 512-13 ("though Hoffa was fooled he at
least had the choice of his companions, but when 'the suspect's ability to select people with whom
he can confide is completely within their control, the police have a unique opportunity to exploit
the suspect's vulnerability"') (quoting White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA.
L. R Y. 581, 605 (1979)) (emphasis in original). What you don't know won't hurt you, it seems
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proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has a right to
legal representation when the government interrogates him."'3 2 The no-
tion that timing is everything had become so deeply entrenched that
neither the majority nor the dissenters bothered to explain whether the
"interrogation" of which they spoke was the same type that appeared
in Miranda.'33
Three years later, in United States v. Henry, 3 4 the Court reiterated
its fidelity to its bright-line distinction between the fifth and sixth
amendments. This time the Court offered a one-line explanation, stat-
ing that the basis of the distinction is that the fifth amendment con-
tains a compulsion requirement whereas the sixth amendment does
not. '3 Beyond that observation, however, which no doubt is an impor-
tant one, neither Henry, its predecessors, nor its critics offers a viable
defense of why the absence of a compulsion requirement in the sixth
amendment should dictate such potentially disparate results from an ad-
missibility standpoint.'3 6 Rather, Henry accepts without explanation that
- the pressures and anxieties of custodial interrogation are conspicuously absent when a suspect
is unaware that police are talking to him. Because Hoffa was not in custody when he confessed,
the precedential value of his litigation was unclear until the Court decided Illinois v. Perkins, 110
S. Ct. 2394 (1990), where an in-custody suspect whose severely misplaced confidence in a cell-
mate/informant led to his murder conviction. See infra notes 220-51 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Supreme Court's recent decision in Perkins, advocating compulsion-based standard in
interrogation analysis).
132. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 401 (emphasis added).
133. Cf. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 287 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Al-
though the Court in Innis emphasized that the Massiah and Miranda rules are distinct, I have
some difficulty in identifying a material difference between these formulations.") (citation omit-
ted). The difference in outcome commanded by the two tests is illustrated by comparing Brewer to
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the latter of which would invariably have led to the
exclusion of the suspect's incriminating statements had formal proceedings commenced. If not for
the officers' knowledge of Williams's peculiar susceptibility to appeals to his Christian decency,
then even Brewer might have come out differently were it a pre-arraignment case. Nonetheless, the
Innis Court's attempt to distinguish Brewer was half-hearted. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
at 300 n.4 ("The definitions of 'interrogation' under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, if indeed
the term 'interrogation' is even apt in the Sixth Amendment context, are not necessarily inter-
changeable, since the policies underlying the two constitutional protections are quite distinct.").
134. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
135. Id. at 273 (cautioning against "infus[ingj Fifth Amendment concerns against compelled self-
incrimination into the Sixth Amendment protection of the right to the assistance of counsel."); see
id. at 282 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("in Miranda cases, the degree of compulsion is criti-
cal .... Massiah, in contrast to Miranda, is not rooted in the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination"); see also Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2397-98 (imposing compulsion re-
quirement when undercover jail plant interrogates incarcerated suspect).
136. At least one scholarly rationale has been offered, although it seems to do little to avoid
the circularity of the fifth-sixth distinction:
The fifth amendment protects a personal right that is violated when police act
against an individual .... The Miranda warnings, by reducing perceived compulsion
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the fifth amendment permits police to exert a certain measure of pres-
sure on an unindicted suspect in a compelling custodial setting, but the
sixth amendment prohibits law enforcement officers from engaging in
any tactics - compelling or not - in a noncustodial setting. 1 7
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun, beyond noting the fifth amend-
ment's compulsion requirement, had "some difficulty in identifying a
material difference between" the Massiah and Miranda rules. 3 8 Ulti-
mately, Brewer and Henry are better suited to fueling the debate over
the Court's distinction between the right to counsel under the fifth and
sixth amendments than to creating a working definition of "interroga-
tion" for purposes of Miranda.3 9 Because the sixth amendment re-
quires formal proceedings and the fifth amendment requires custody
and interrogation, and the former refers to a suspect's right "to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence" 14 and not to "be[ing] com-
pelled ... to be a witness against himself,' 41 the two doctrines have
gone their separate ways. While the significant sixth amendment cases
recognize that interrogation is relevant in determining whether the gov-
ernment has violated a suspect's right to counsel, their reliance on po-
lice attempts to "deliberately elicit" incriminating responses has relieved
the Court of the burden of defining "interrogation."
can thus eliminate fifth amendment violations at the moment they might otherwise
occur. The sixth amendment is more procedural, protecting the fairness of the adver-
sary process. The fairness of that process becomes an issue only after the commence-
ment of adversary proceedings.
Note, Confusing the Fifth Amendment with the Sixth: Lower Court Misapplication of the Innis
Definition of Interrogation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1073, 1088-89 (1989) [hereinafter Confusing the
Fifth]. Not only is it unclear why a suspect's right to counsel is any less "personal" than his
right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself, but the above personal/systemic dichot-
omy ascribes to "formal proceedings" a magical quality that ignores the crucial role that police
play in the adversarial process. For a compelling presentation of police as players in the adversar-
ial process, see Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure, in Y. KIusAR, F. INBAu & T. ARNOLD, CRMINAL JUSTICE IN OuR TMnE 3 (A. Ho-
ward ed. 1965).
The Court in Henry offered an explanation as well. Unlike noncustodial sixth amendment set-
tings, fifth amendment encounters place suspects on the firm footing of an "arm's length" adver-
sarial context in which a suspect "is typically aware that his statements may be used against
him." United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. at 273. The majority's contract-law analogy was a low
point for Miranda, which has not changed so much that its very premise - that suspects unrepre-
sented by counsel typically are not aware that their statements may be used against them -
should have been forgotten.
137. See supra note 133.
138. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. at 287 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
139. In many ways, Brewer was an exaggerated, post-indictment version of Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). Police ploys in both cases involved indirect or "functional equivalent"
questioning which led to incriminating responses and murder convictions. See supra note 133.
140. U.S. CoNs'r. ,AMND. VI.
141. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.
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C. The Fifth Amendment Cases
1. Rhode Island v. Innis
The Court has since said that its approach to post-formal proceed-
ings cases is "not necessarily interchangeable" 1 42 with Miranda's pre-
formal proceedings approach. The Court provided more guidance for
defining interrogation under the fifth amendment in Rhode Island v.
Innis. 43
Five days after a Providence taxicab driver was killed by a fare
wielding a sawed-off shotgun, another driver told police he had just
been held up by a man, also with a sawed-off shotgun.'" The robbery
victim identified Innis from a police photo, and directed them to where
he had dropped off his assailant. Police found Innis there, arrested
him and issued Miranda warnings. After claiming his right to counsel,
three officers drove him to the stationhouse. 45 On the way, Officers
Gleckman and McKenna, in the company of Officer Williams, dis-
cussed the missing shotgun:
At this point, I was talking back and forth with Patrolman
McKenna stating that I frequent this area while on patrol and
[that because a school for handicapped children is located
nearbyJ there's a lot of handicapped children running around
in this area, and God forbid one of them might find a
weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves.'"6
Innis then interrupted the officers and instructed them to turn around
so he could show them where the gun was. 47 Innis was given Miranda
warnings again at the scene of his arrest, but he insisted he "wanted to
get the gun out of the way because of the kids in the area in the
school.' 1  He then led police to a nearby field where the gun was hid-
den. 149
142. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 n.4.
143. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
144. Id. at 293.
145. Id. at 294. Police Captain Leyden told the officers not to "question ... intimidate or
coerce [Innis] in any way." Id. (citation omitted).
146. Id. at 294-95.
147. At that point, they had travelled only a mile in the few minutes they had ridden together.
Id. at 295. This fact was relevant to Justice Marshall, who inferred that the questioning must
have commenced almost immediately after the officers and the suspect entered the car, thus add-
ing to the pressures on the suspect to speak. Id. at 305-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting). There is
some evidence that Officer Gleckman rode beside Innis in the back seat. Id. at 315-16 n.16 (Stev-
ens, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 295.
149. Id. Police found the deceased driver buried in a shallow grave in Coventry, Rhode Island.
He died from a shotgun blast to the back of the head. Id. at 293.
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The trial court denied his motion to suppress the statements, but the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, relying on Brewer, set aside his convic-
tion because police had interrogated him without first obtaining a
waiver of rights. 50 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to define "in-
terrogation" within the meaning of Miranda.
The divided Court, through Justice Stewart, reversed. The Court re-
jected any notion that Miranda applies only to express questioning of
defendants in custody. Rather, it was the "interrogation environment,"
"created by the interplay of interrogation and custody," noted the In-
nis Court, that constituted "interrogation."' 5 Citing Miranda's reliance
on psychological ploys meant to elicit confessions, as well as its refer-
ence to rigged lineups and other tactics short of express questioning,
the Court structured a broad definition of "interrogation," excluding
from its definition only statements given "freely and voluntarily.' 5 2
More than in any other case since Miranda, the Court in Innis em-
phasized the nexus between interrogation and custody, but still failed to
take that relationship into account in the case before it. After alluding
to the way in which "the interplay of interrogation and custody ...
undermine the privilege," Justice Stewart wrote that custody "without
more" is insufficient to trigger Miranda.53 Instead, interrogation "must
reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in
custody itself.' ' 54 That measure of compulsion arises under express cus-
todial questioning or its functional equivalent, which includes "any
words or actions on the part of police (other than those normally at-
tendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasona-
bly likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." '9 55
The Court stated that the likelihood of incrimination should be as-
sessed under an objective test, evaluated from the suspect's perspec-
tive. 56 In this respect, it departed from the sixth amendment cases,
which looked to the subjective intent of police. Under Innis, police in-
tent serves as an informative but not dispositive index to whether po-
lice should have known a particular practice was likely to elicit an
incriminating response. Accordingly, any police practice designed to
150. The state supreme court found that police, however interested in the well-being of children,
and however deftly they avoided engaging in direct questioning, subjected Innis to .'subtle coer-
cion'" equivalent to .'interrogation"' within the meaning of Miranda. The court suppressed the
shotgun and the testimony relating to its discovery, and ordered a new trial. Id. at 296-97.
151. Id. at 299 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 457-58).
152. Id. at 299-300 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 478).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 300.




elicit an incriminating response would "likely" be one that police
should have anticipated would do so.5 7 The Court completed its new
rule with a provision that made police "[un]accountable for the unfore-
seeable results of their words or actions,"' 58 yet held them answerable
for "any knowledge [they] may have had concerning the unusual sus-
ceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion.'9 5 9
Applying this standard, the Court classified the officers' conversation
as less than express questioning. ° Yet because nothing in the record
suggested that Innis was "peculiarly susceptible' 1 6' to the plight of
handicapped children, or that he was "unusually disoriented or up-
set, 1 62 the Court found that the officers neither fashioned their re-
marks to elicit an incriminating response, nor should they have
expected such a result. 63 "[A] few offhand remarks," neither "evoca-
tive" nor "lengthy," may have "struck a responsive chord" in Innis,
but constituted only "subtle compulsion"'" no greater than if Innis
had unexpectedly confessed while being driven by police "past the site
of the concealed weapon while taking the most direct route to the po-
lice station."' 6 Although merely driving past the site is a far cry from
what the officers actually did, the Court nevertheless held that police
did not interrogate Innis within the meaning of Miranda.
Four justices wrote separate opinions. Justice White's one-page con-
curring opinion held fast to his position in Brewer, concluding that
157. In this sense, the subjective intent of officers retained some significance in the majority's
approach:
This is not to say that the intent of the police is irrelevant, for it may well have a
bearing on whether the police should have known that their words or actions were
reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response. In particular, where a police
practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely
that the practice will not also be one which the police should have known was rea-
sonably likely to have that effect.
Id. at 301-02 n.7.
158. Id. at 301-02.
159. Id. at 302 n.8. That knowledge "might be an important factor in determining whether the
police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi-
nating response from the suspect." Id.
160. Id. at 302.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 303. Three years after Innis, in California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per
curiam), the Court determined that the drunken, emotionally distraught condition of the suspect
was irrelevant to whether he was in police custody. The Court made no attempt to explain the
incongruity of Innis and Beheler.
163. The Court thought it natural (and therefore constitutional) for the officers to express their
concern for the child's welfare. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 303 n.9.
164. Id. at 303.
165. Id. at 303 n.l0.
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questions without coercion are constitutionally permissible. 66 Chief
Justice Burger concurred in the judgment that Innis had not been inter-
rogated, but rejected the majority's definition. 6 1 Psychiatrists, he
wrote, much less police officers, cannot reasonably be expected to
spontaneously evaluate the "suggestibility and susceptibility" of an ac-
cused.'6 As a result, he disagreed with that portion of the Court's
holding.
Justice Marshall, on the other hand, while accepting the Court's defi-
nition, rejected only the "ludicrous" result. He noted that Innis en-
dured a 4:30 a.m. arrest, followed by handcuffs, a search, warnings,
and a trip in a caged wagon accompanied by three officers. 16 9 Those
officers, by "'talking back and forth' in close quarters with the suspect
[and] traveling past the very place where they believed the weapon was
located," became aware of and responsible "for the pressures ... they
created."' 170 Indeed, the police portrait in which preserving the life of a
handicapped "little girl"' 71 turns on recovering a missing weapon would
fail to stir only the most callous of suspects.17
Justice Stevens's dissent challenged not only the Court's holding, but
also its definition of "interrogation." He offered an alternative defini-
tion which contained both an objective and a subjective component. 73
166. Id. at 304 (White, J., concurring) (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 429-38) (White,
., dissenting).
167. Id. at 304-05 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
168. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (citing id. at 302 n.8).
169. Id. at 305-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
171. Patrolman Williams, one of the three officers who transported Innis from Davenport to
Des Moines, said nothing along the way but heard Officer Gleckman say "it would be too bad if
the little . . . girl - would pick up the gun, maybe kill herself." Id. at 295 (citation omitted).
172. The common morality play theme that conditions the return to virtue on the expulsion of
vice is illustrated in the mid-15th century play "Mankind." MEDIEVAL DRAA 901 (D. Bevington
ed. 1975). In the officers' morality play, the return to virtue (the triumph of law and order) was
conditioned on saving a handicapped schoolgirl's life. The expulsion of the vice (the apprehension,
prosecution, conviction, and punishment of the wrongdoer), on the other hand, involved finding
and removing the gun. Cf. Collins & Welsh, Miranda's Fate in the Burger Court, THE CENTER
MAoAzu-E 43, 44-45 (Sept./Oct. 1980) ("defendant was made an unwitting participant in a police-
directed morality play.").
For Justice Marshall, not only was it "ludicrous" to expect such an obvious ploy to be dis-
missed as idle banter, but appeals to 'decency and honor' (are] a classic interrogation tech-
nique." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing F. INBAU & J.
REID, CRnaNAL INTERROGATION AND CoNuEssioNs 60-62 (2d ed. 1967)). But see Frey, supra note 5,
at 732 (Deputy Solicitor General finding it "extraordinary that three members of the United States
Supreme Court . . . discern in the Constitution ... a principle that prohibits police from appeal-
ing to the conscience of a person suspected of having committed a serious crime.").
173. In cases where the suspect invokes his rights, "is]tatements that appear to call for a re-
sponse from the suspect, as well as those that are designed to do so, should be considered inter-
rogation." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 311 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Under the objective component, "any statement that would normally
be understood by the average listener as calling for a response is the
functional equivalent of a direct question, whether or not it is punctu-
ated by a question mark.' ' 74 That component was intended to shift the
majority's prohibition of "interrogation that is likely to be successful"
to a flat ban against "any interrogation at all.' ' 7 Under the subjective
component, once a suspect exercises his right to cut off questioning,
police "are prohibited from making deliberate attempts to elicit state-
ments from the suspect.' 76
His adaptation of the subjective test to pre-formal proceedings called
on the work of Professor Yale Kamisar, whose article furnished the
rationale for treating fifth and sixth amendment interrogation identi-
cally once a suspect invokes the right to counsel.' 77 In insisting on the
subjective approach, Justice Stevens rejected the majority's conclusion
that his test was likely to be coextensive with theirs. 7 1 In his view,
police often conduct interrogations fully expecting failure. 7 9 As a re-
sult, he strongly disapproved of a test that would admit into evidence
the fruits of every longshot police tactic and that would exclude only
those statements actually phrased as questions. 80
Justice Stevens failed to explain how an officer's undisclosed inten-
tions are relevant when the suspect is unaware of the interrogation en-
174. Id. at 309, 311-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 309 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104); Michi-
gan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 110 n.2 (White, J., concurring in the result); see Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. at 467 ("[an] accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the
exercise of those rights must be fully honored.").
177. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 310 & n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. at 398-99, and Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What is
"Interrogation"? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEo. L.J. 1, 73 (1978)); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. at 473-74 ("Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the indi-
vidual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to
remain silent, the interrogation must cease.").
178. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 310-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 302 n.7)
("[Wihere a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it is
unlikely that the practice will not also be one which the police should have known was reasonably
likely to have that effect."). The subjective "deliberate elicitation" element of Justice Stevens's
definition is straight from Massiah.
179. Id. at 311 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. See id. at 312 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Even under the majority's objective test, Justice
Stevens would have voted to exclude Innis's incriminating statements. The carefully chosen, "emo-
tionally charged" language, replete with "God forbid" a "little girl" should find the gun and
"maybe kill herself," should have alerted Officer Gleckman that his statement was likely to elicit
an incriminating response. Id. at 312-13 & n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In this respect, Justice
Stevens echoed Justice Marshall. Cf. White, Rhode Island v. Innis: The Significance of a Sus-
pect's Assertion of His Right to Counsel, 17 Am. Casu. L. REv. 53, 68 (1979) (because chance of
child finding gun was slim, officers' purported safety aspirations were pretextual).
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vironment. 18 But his lack of concern for the problems with relying on
officers' undisclosed intentions is lessened somewhat by design. The
subjective element of Justice Stevens' approach applies only when the
suspect invokes the right to counsel.8 2 In those cases, the police-suspect
encounter begins to resemble a post-indictment case; invocation of the
right to counsel arguably moves the case one step closer to the sixth
amendment, one step closer to a "critical stage" of the trial episode.'83
At that point, as the sixth amendment cases make clear, protections are
greater; even noncompelling tactics are impermissible. Although a view
that merges fifth and sixth amendment standards for suspects who in-
voke their rights has much to recommend it, the Court has held other-
wise. 184
181. For example, it would hardly pass the straight-face test to argue that officers created an
interrogation environment merely by driving past the site where the evidence was hidden, secretly
desiring that the suspect would be provoked into incriminating himself. See I W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, supra note 119, § 6.7, at 499-503 (discussing Innis and the Supreme Court's "functional
equivalent" test for determining when interrogation has occurred). The outcome would be differ-
ent, however, if police went out of their way in order to bring the suspect to the site. The test
case for whether protections should be extended to suspects who are unaware of the interrogation
environment is Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990), discussed infra notes 220-51 and accom-
panying text.
182. Y. Kamisar, "Police Interrogation and Confessions," PREPARED REMARKS AT THE U.S.
LAW WEK'S CO sTITuTioNAL LAW CONFERENCE 34-36 (Sept. 12, 1987) (on file with author) [here-
inafter KAmsAR REMARKs]. The Court purports to have covered the question of what "scrupu-
lously honor" means. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (police cannot "interrogate"
accused who invokes right to counsel unless and until accused initiates further discussion relating
to investigation and validly waives rights).
183. At the very least, Justice Stevens's "intent of the officer" test successfully relieves police
of the impossible task of evaluating with precision the "likelihood" that a suspect will offer an
incriminating response. According to one commentator, at least two views other than Justice Stev-
ens's have been presented in the academic community. See Note, Confusing the Fifth, supra note
136, at 1084-87 (discussing scholarly comment on Innis's "reasonably likely to elicit" standard).
The first view, Professor Welsh White's, is designed to preserve both the objective approach and
a close correlation between the officer's purpose and the Court's "reasonably likely" standard.
White, Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 78
MIcH. L. REv. 1209, 1225-31 (1980). Professors LaFave and Israel have endorsed White's test,
which states that Innis should be interpreted to turn on the objective purpose manifested by po-
lice. 1 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 119, § 6.7, at 502-03. An officer should know his
actions are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response when he knows that the suspect
will view them as designed to achieve that purpose. If, therefore, an objective observer possessing
the same knowledge of the suspect as does the officer would, on hearing the officer's remarks,
infer that they were designed to elicit an incriminating response, then the remarks are "interroga-
tion." Professor Kamisar's view, on the other hand, relies on the level of "coerciveness" of po-
lice conduct, not the likelihood of success or the government's purpose. KAmsAR REmARxs, supra
note 182, at 37.
184. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (protecting suspects who have claimed right
only from continued "interrogation").
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2. Arizona v. Mauro
Arizona v. Mauro' enters where Innis broke down, the point at
which police have the responsibility of predicting how likely a particu-
lar practice is to induce an incriminating response. William Mauro en-
tered a K mart store claiming to have murdered his son.16 After police
arrived, he led them to the child's body, and, like his counterpart In-
nis, invoked his right to counsel after receiving proper Miranda warn-
ings. 8 7 Lacking a secure place to detain Mauro, police put him in the
office of Flagstaff Police Captain Latham. Meanwhile, a Detective
Manson was in another room questioning Mauro's wife, who had made
"insistent demands" to speak to her husband."8 Manson consulted with
his sergeant, and then told the couple they could speak together only
in his presence. He brought Mrs. Mauro to the captain's office and
seated himself at the desk, placing a tape recorder on top.18 9 In the
Mauros' brief conversation, Mrs. Mauro expressed regret that they ne-
glected to put their battered son in the hospital, and worried whether
they could afford to bury the boy.' 90 Mr. Mauro admonished her to
"shut up" until receiving "rights of attorney."''
Relying at trial on an insanity defense, Mauro moved on Innis
grounds to suppress the tape, which the prosecution presented as evi-
dence of his sanity on the day of the crime. 92 The trial court denied
the motion, concluding that because police were motivated by "safety,"
"security," and the possibility that the Mauros "might cook up a lie,"
the procedure was proper. 9 3 Mauro was convicted of murder and child
abuse, and sentenced to death. 194
185. 481 U.S. 520 (1987).
186. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. at 521.
187. Id. at 522.
188. Id. at 522, 528. The trial court found that officers had tried to discourage her from talk-
ing to her husband. Id. at 528.
189. Id. at 522. It was undisputed that Detective Manson placed the tape recorder in "plain
sight." Id.
190. Id. at 522 n.1.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 523. Mauro dispels the myth that Miranda violations are used by defense lawyers
only in the guilt phase of criminal prosecutions. See Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091,
1094-1100 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Miranda error harmless in neither guilt phase of case nor in
sentencing phase).
193. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. at 523.
194. Id. at 524. On remand, the state court upheld the convictions for first degree murder and
child abuse, but found that the defendant's mental instability was a mitigating factor in justifying
the reduction of the death penalty to life imprisonment. State v. Mauro, 159 Ariz. 186, 209, 766
P.2d 59, 82 (1988).
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The Arizona Supreme Court accepted Mauro's Innis argument and
reversed the trial court's admission of the tape. 95 The sergeant's admis-
sion that it was "possible" the conversation would yield incriminating
statements led the state's highest court to conclude that "possible" was
"likely" enough to satisfy Innis, and therefore held that the police "in-
terrogated" Mauro. 96 The United States Supreme Court granted the
State's petition for certiorari to correct the Arizona Supreme Court's
misconstruction of Innis.'9
After reviewing Miranda and Innis, the five-justice majority, through
Justice Powell, 98 concluded that Flagstaff police did not subject Mauro
to "compelling influences, psychological ploys, or direct question-
ing," 99 or interrogation by any other name. Mauro highlights the two
significant flaws of Innis. First, even though the suspect in both cases
was warned and invoked his right to counsel, in order to "scrupulously
honor" an invocation of rights, police need only avoid doing what the
law proscribes them from doing before the suspect invoked the right.
By failing to give greater breadth to "scrupulously honor," the Court
perpetuated the practice, begun in Innis, of collapsing second-level
(post-warnings) into first-level (pre-warnings) Miranda analysis.m The
result is similar to that obtained in significant deprivations analysis
where, by collapsing significant deprivations and custody standards, the
Court vitiated protections offered by the former by subsuming them in
the less protective safeguards of the latter. Here, however, the result
may be more nefarious. It makes plain that suspects who claim their
constitutional rights receive no greater protections from coercive police
tactics than those who do not.301
As in Innis, the Court considered only whether Mauro was interro-
gated, and in so doing, relied most heavily on Innis's problematical
mathematics of self-incrimination. Accepting the Arizona Supreme
195. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. at 524.
196. Id. at 524-25 & n.2.
197. Id. at 525.
198. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and
Scalia.
199. Id. at 529. During the brief conversation, Manson asked two questions, both apparently
directed at Mrs. Mauro: "Do you know a reverend or a priest or someone you can talk to -
take care of David?" and "Did you want to talk to your husband any more?" Id. at 523 n.l. As
the majority noted, "Detective Manson asked [Mr.) Mauro no questions about the crime or his
conduct." Id. at 527.
200. Professor Kamisar challenged the way the Court framed the issue raised in the petition.
Given that Mauro received warnings and invoked his right to counsel, the precise issue under
Miranda was not the first.level question of whether police interrogated Mauro, but the second-
level question of whether they had scrupulously honored his claimed rights. Kummsa RmdAmx,
supra note 182, at 34-36.
201. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 485 (police tactics short of interrogation sufficiently
respect suspect's invocation of right to counsel).
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Court's reasoning, but not its holding, the Court noted that the offi-
cers were aware that Mauro possibly would incriminate himself if per-
mitted to speak with his wife. 202 The state court thus expanded
"possible" into "likely." The Supreme Court, however, reasoned that
"likely" here was not as likely as the "subtle compulsion" found per-
missible in Innis, and thus not "likely" enough to warrant exclusion of
the statements under Innis.23 As "volunteered statements" within the
meaning of Miranda, the Court found that police had not attempted to
capitalize on "the coercive nature of confinement" -in order to extract
a confession. Rather, the Court said, in permitting the Mauros to con-
fer, but refusing to allow them to do so privately, police "acted rea-
sonably and lawfully."
Justice Stevens wrote for the four dissenting Justices, measuring in-
terrogation, as he did in Innis, from the subjective intentions of police
in cases where the suspect has invoked the right to counsel.2 5 A con-
spicuous lack of advance warning that the conversation would be
taped, he argued, helped police convert Mrs. Mauro's wish to speak to
her husband into a "powerful psychological ploy" amounting to "in-
terrogation."' Moreover, Detective Manson,0 Sergeant Allen,2 and
Captain Latham2 each testified at trial that they viewed the Mauros'
conversation as a potential source of incriminating evidence. With this
in mind, Justice Stevens tried his own hand at mathematics. For him,
the orchestrated conversation made incriminating statements "not only
likely, but highly probable.''210
The mitigating factors cited by the majority were, in Justice Stevens's
view, unpersuasive.2 1 1 That police could lay claim to a legitimate secu-
rity-based motive for witnessing and recording the conversation should
202. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. at 528-29 & n.6.
203. Id. Just how Sergeant Allen's testimony that he "knew it was possible that [Mauro] might
make incriminating statements," permitted the Arizona Supreme Court to conclude that police
knew "incriminating statements were likely to be made," did not seem to concern the Supreme
Court. Id. at 524 n.2 (emphasis added).
204. Id. at 530.
205. Id. at 532 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 1 W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAE, ClUINAL PROCE-
DURE § 6.7, at 94-95 (Supp. 1990) (stating that in majority's view, neither subjective intent of
police nor their actual perception of scenario is controlling); Note, Criminal Procedure, 19 TEx.
TE CH. L. Rnv, 1195, 1204-05 (1988) (Mauro flouts Innis's recognition of relevance of police moti-
vations).
206. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. at 530-31 & n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). His advance-warning
argument, however, suffers from a record that can be read as easily to the contrary. Id. at 527-28
n.5.
207. Id. at 530-31 n.l (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 524 n.2.
209. Id. at 535 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 536 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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not avoid the consequences of an illegitimate motive.2 12 And even
though Mrs. Mauro insisted on seeing her husband, the time, place,
and manner of the meeting were subject to police exploitation.2 13
Justice Stevens saw no need to answer the majority's claim that police
did not "compel or even encourage" Mauro to speak with his wife or
to incriminate himself. 21 4 As he argued in Innis, once a suspect invokes
his right to counsel, police admissions of their subjective intent are
enough without resort to an objective approach.215
Like Innis, Mauro leads reviewing courts to attempt measurements of
the "likelihood" of incrimination. Because such attempts invariably
lead to inaccuracies, a shift in focus in the interrogation inquiry may
be in order. The majority suggested, if only indirectly, that the inquiry
be infused with the core essence of the fifth amendment privilege - a
threshold requirement of at least some measure of compulsion before
Miranda attaches. 216 That way, the fact that it was Mrs. Mauro's idea
to speak with her husband - a fact of questionable materiality under
Innis - becomes highly relevant. How a conversation, even if staged,
witnessed, and recorded, which is held at the parties' (or at least one
party's) request, or, as in this case "insistence," can "compel" is diffi-
cult to conceptualize. 21 7 No one who wishes to remain silent would in-
sist on speaking, certainly not to authorities. Yet by insisting on
212. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). It has been said that
so long as the police conduct is likely to elicit incriminating statements and thus
endanger the privilege, it is police 'interrogation' regardless of its primary purpose or
motivation, and that if it otherwise qualifies as 'interrogation,' it does not become
something else because the interrogator[] [has another purpose] rather than the pro-
curing of incriminating statements....
Y. KAi SAs, KY-AstA ESSAYs, supra note 15, at 146 (citing Graham, supra note 10, at 104-06,
126-29). This definition of "interrogation" is close to the one the Court subsequently adopted for
use in fifth amendment settings. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (holding that "inter-
rogation" refers to any words or actions by police that they should know are reasonably likely to
elicit incriminating response from suspect).
213. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. at 536 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 534 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216. "Mauro was not subjected to compelling influences, psychological ploys, or direct ques-
tioning." Id. at 529. Nor did police use "the coercive nature of confinement to extract [a] confes-
sion." Id. at 530.
217. See KAmIsAR Rtulxs, supra note 182, at 37-48. Professors LaFave and Israel, however,
seem to disagree with this observation. In their view, Mauro's keepers, by arranging the meeting
to be conducted in their presence, made it clear to Mauro (and any objective observer for that
matter) that the setting called for a response. 1 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CR rIMNAL PROCEDURE §
6.7, at 80 (Supp. 1989). Whether it mattered that the meeting was suspect-initiated, they did not
address. Furthermore, discomfort with the Flagstaff officers' conduct may flow from a perceived
sanctity about the marital relationship that cannot be captured by Byzantine tests about "likeli-
hood" or "compulsion." How many of Mauro's opponents would hold fast if the couple had
been unmarried suspects whose only relationship was as partners in crime?
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speaking to a co-suspect and not to authorities, Mrs. Mauro handed
police an unenviable trilemma: 1) paternalistically save the couple from
their impulses to incriminate themselves by prohibiting the conversation;
2) permit the conversation to take place in private despite the security
risks (assuming the risks are real); or 3) gladly accept the windfall testi-
mony offered by the couple, either by taping or simply witnessing the
conversation. The third option, the one police chose, lacks the pater-
nalism underlying the first option, but does not by itself contain a de-
gree of compulsion sufficient to implicate the privilege.
This result shows the poverty of the Innis standard, if taken liter-
ally. 21 "Reasonably likely" is broad enough to exclude evidence ob-
tained without a trace of compulsion. Thus, the justices are forced to
resort, as they were here, to the familiar tools of legal reasoning
needed to temper Innis. Perhaps, then, in cases involving first-level
Miranda rights, the better view would be to amend Innis to include
any words or actions that create an atmosphere of compulsion suffi-
cient to elicit an incriminating response. That way, the foundation of
the privilege would make its way into the calculus, thereby preventing
zero-pressure' 9 tactics from resulting in the exclusion of confessions,
while doing so in a forthright manner. In cases involving second-level
rights, a stricter restriction on police conduct is in order. In those
cases, where the suspect's invocation of rights pushes the case closer to
the critical stages of the accusatorial process, police conduct need not
be compelling enough to constitute "interrogation" in order to be "un-
scrupulous" enough to demand exclusion. As Justice Stevens and Pro-
fessor Kamisar have suggested, rather than require compulsion in
second-level rights cases, "scrupulous" respect of a suspect's invocation
of rights should mirror .the more suspect-minded sixth amendment stan-
dard.
3. Illinois v. Perkins
More than any of its predecessors, the Court's pronouncement in Illi-
nois v. Perkins2° openly advocates the need for such a compulsion-
218. The very result in Innis demonstrates that the Court intended that the definition not be
taken at its word. A literal application of the standard articulated in that case would invalidate
confessions obtained from police communication to the suspect about the strength of the prosecu-
tion's case against him, or when an undercover jail plant extracts a confession from an unwitting,
incarcerated suspect. 1 W. LAFAVE & J. IsAEL, supra note 27, § 6.7, at 511-14. E.g., Lewis v.
Florida, 486 U.S. 1036, 1037 (1986) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). But see Per-
kins v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. at 2397 (jail plant interrogation of unwarned suspect permitted under
Miranda); infra notes 220-51 and accompanying text (discussing Perkins).
219. Cf. Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to "Recon-
sidering Miranda," 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 938, 939 & n.4 (1987) (arguing that zero-pressure theory
no longer is good law since Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)).
220. 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
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based standard in interrogation analysis.Y' In Perkins, the Court held
that incriminating statements obtained through undercover jail plants
whose official identities were hidden from an unwarned suspect were
permissible under Miranda.m While Perkins was being held in an Illi-
nois county jail on aggravated battery charges, a government inform-
ant, Chariton, masquerading as a confidant, together with Parisi, an
undercover police officer, elicited a confession from him. 23 Charlton
and Parisi extracted the confession through "casual conversation" pur-
suant to a government ruse designed to hoodwink Perkins into disclos-
ing his role in the unsolved East St. Louis murder of a man named
Stephenson.
Earlier, Charlton had been a co-inmate of Perkins in an Illinois peni-
tentiary where Perkins told him about a contract felony-murder he had
committed.22 Motivated by his belief that "[p]eople shouldn't kill peo-
ple," 22 Charlton revealed to police facts about the unsolved murder
that only a perpetrator could have known. Police subsequently traced
the recently released Perkins to the county jail, where Parisi and Charl-
ton, placed in a cell with Perkins, suggested that the three of them
attempt a "break-out." Parisi told Perkins that the escape might in-
volve some killing, and then asked Perkins whether he had ever
"'done"' anybody. 27 In response, Perkins launched into a diatribe on
the details of the Stephenson murder. 2m After the appellate court af-
firmed on Miranda grounds the trial court's suppression of the jail-
house confession,2 9 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer
221. Id. at 2397. Neither Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, nor Justices Brennan or Mar-
shall, writing separately, characterized Perkins as an "interrogation" case, although it would make
little sense to call it anything else.
222. Id. at 2396.
223. Id.
224. Id. Perkins's account of the tale is detailed. He had been paid $5,000 by a man who
wanted Stephenson (the victim) maimed because Stephenson owed the man money for drugs and
was having an affair with the man's wife. After casing Stephenson's house for about a week,
Perkins, armed with a .12 gauge shotgun, approached his victim, asked him to step into the ga-
rage, asked him whether his name was "Steve," then shot him in the right leg. The blast severed
Stephenson's femoral artery; he bled to death in 30 seconds. Perkins escaped with two confeder-
ates by car. BRIEF vOR rH UNrrw STATES AS AMacus CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER at 4-5 n.2,
Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990) (No. 88-1972).
225. P zinoaN's BRIuF, supra note 224, at 2.
226. Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2396. Parisi told Perkins that he "wasn't going to do any
more time," and suggested that the three of them escape. Perkins believed that the three men
(with the help of his girlfriend, who allegedly could smuggle a pistol into them) could "break
out" of the "rinky-dink" county jail. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. People v. Perkins, 176 Ill. App. 3d 443, 449-50, 531 N.E.2d 141, 145-46 (1988).
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whether undercover agents must issue incarcerated suspects Miranda
warnings before interrogating them.
With the future of all undercover investigations of incarcerated sus-
pects at stake, Justice Kennedy began the Court's opinion by observing
that the paradigmatic compulsion of police-dominated settings is absent
when a suspect "freely" speaks to someone donning prison grays
rather than police blues.230 Innis, stated the Court, stands for the prop-
osition that "[c]oercion is determined from the perspective of the sus-
pect. ' 23' He went so far as to allude to Miranda's "interplay"
language,32 but declined to discuss how that interplay of custody and
interrogation played upon Perkins's will. After conceding that Perkins
was "in custody in a technical sense, ' 233 the Court, presumably ad-
dressing the interrogation component, concluded that "Miranda was
not meant to protect suspects from boasting about their criminal activi-
ties in front of persons whom they believe to be their cellmates. '2 34
Because even the most restrictive reading of Innis would recognize
Parisi's direct questioning ("Have you ever 'done' anybody?") as "rea-
sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response,' '235 the Court's deci-
sion to decide the interrogation question against Perkins is explainable
only by the unique facts of the case. When a suspect is unaware that
he is dealing with government authorities, Innis's interrogation standard
drops out. Thus, the Court's attempt to distinguish Mathis, a prison-
cell interrogation held to violate Miranda, centered on Mathis's aware-
ness that he was dealing with officials, not on the fact that Mathis was
"interrogated" and Perkins was not. 2 6 If Perkins admittedly was in
custody, and officers clearly interrogated him within the meaning of
Innis, then the question arises: on what basis could the Court avoid
the dictates of Miranda?
At this point, Berkemer comes to mind. Berkemer did not expressly
pronounce an exception to Miranda, perhaps because it was reluctant
230. Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2397.
231. Id. (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301). There are two problems with this
observation. First, Innis said "interrogation" - not "coercion" - is judged from a suspect's
perspective. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300. Second, the Court seems to have forgotten its
own recognition in Innis that police motives are relevant to whether a suspect is interrogated
within the meaning of Miranda. Id. at 301-02 n.7.
232. Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2397 (quoting Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and
Miranda: What is "Interrogation"? When Does it Matter?, 67 GEo. L.J. 1, 63 (1978)).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 2398.
235. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 303.
236. Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2398. In neither Mathis nor Perkins did the Court take
seriously the government's claim that incarceration on an unrelated charge is somehow less restric-
tive than "custody" or is less than a significant deprivation of freedom.
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to do so only three weeks after it had announced another exception,
Quarles's "public safety" exception.2 7 However, the holdings of both
Berkemer and Perkins are exceptions of a sort. While Berkemer
avoided the literal language of Miranda by concluding that not all sig-
nificant deprivations of freedom deserve warnings, Perkins did so by
concluding that in an interrogation context some measure of compul-
sion must be present before Miranda will attach. 21 When juxtaposed to
Berkemer, the Perkins exception seems benign. In the former, the
Court "decline[d] to accord talismanic power" to Miranda's protection
of significant deprivations, 3 9 even though "a traffic stop significantly
curtails the 'freedom of action' of the driver and the passengers."" In
other words, the Court in Berkemer dodged Miranda, fully aware that
custodial restraint always is compelling. Interrogation by undercover
agents, however, is not.
Not only is the Perkins exception harmlessly narrow,2 l but it was
also made easier by the existence of a case already decided. In Hoffa
v. United States,22 decided the term after Miranda, a jailbird-turned-
informant "worm[ed] his way into Hoffa's hotel suite ... and ...
entourage," and gave the government (in exchange for very favorable
treatment) information about Jimmy Hoffa's attempt to bribe jurors in
Hoffa's Taft-Hartley Act trial.324 Hoffa's lawyers fired constitutional
claims at tle Court, from fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment argu-
ments to due process and amorphous privacy claims.2" Over a forceful
dissent in which Chief Justice Warren decried the self-serving testimony
237. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655 (public safety exception to Miranda require-
ments). Exceptions seem to come in pairs. Perkins was accompanied by a "routine booking ques-
tion" exception. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 2650 (1990) (declaring this
exception); see also supra note 119 (discussing Muniz).
238. Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2397. "Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false
sense of security that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak are not within
Miranda's concerns." Id. (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495) (officer's false statement
to unwarned suspect that suspect's fingerprints had been found at crime scene had "nothing to do
with whether respondent was in custody").
239. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 437.
240. Id. at 436.
241. A liberal perspective would view Perkins as a missed opportunity to retreat from the bright
line of Massiah, thus granting the same protections that benefitted "formal proceedings" suspects
like Massiah, Brewer, and Henry to in-custody suspects like Perkins. Such an expansive view of
constitutional protections, reminiscent of Escobedo's "focus" test, is no longer viable.
242. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
243. Id. at 319 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
244. Although Justice Douglas voted to dismiss the writ of certiorari in Hoffa, he wrote in
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (decided the same
day) that Hoffa, Osborn, and Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (also decided the same
day) each involved "aggressive breaches of privacy by the Government," breaches of the "aura of
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that the government had purchased at a price too high for any jailbird
to resist, the Court, reaching back to Chief Justice Marshall's review
of the 1807 trial of Aaron Burr, wrote that "a necessary element of
compulsory self-incrimination is some kind of compulsion."2 4 Thus,
Perkins, it seems, had been settled years ago.
For dissenting Justice Marshall, however, Hoffa lacked a critical ele-
ment that distinguished it from Perkins: Hoffa was not incarcerated
when he incriminated himself.2 Showing a certain measure of sensitiv-
ity to the synergistic relationship of custody and interrogation, Justice
Marshall refused to extend to the government the privilege to treat in-
carcerated and unincarcerated suspects identically. The pressures unique
to custody, he argued, increase the likelihood of jailhouse bravado and
hence, of confessions.2 7 Despite Justice Marshall's protest, to say that
an incarcerated suspect (like Perkins) deserves no greater protection
from surreptitious government deceit than does. a suspect temporarily
free on bail (like Hoffa) is no great leap. In both cases the suspect's
compulsion level was at or near zero.
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, observed that the basis of
exclusion in undercover pre-indictment interrogations of incarcerated
suspects is the due process clause, not the privilege.2" In Brennan's
view, if after Perkins the government assumes disguises, from friend or
family to priest or defense lawyer, relaxing the limits on the intrusive
indignities of criminal investigations, such deception still may be subject
to exclusion. As long as the undercover agent's role is hidden from the
suspect, however, the privilege is not implicated.
Justice Brennan's analysis stopped short of considering what would
happen if the undercover agents went beyond mere conversation in
their attempt to obtain a confession. If "an undercover police officer
beats a confession 6ut of a suspect," and the confession is held at trial
to be admissible because "the suspect thought the officer was another
privacy" found lurking around the fourth amendment (among other places) thanks to Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). The majority's holding in Hoffa, argued Justice Douglas,
"makes it possible for the Government to use willy-nilly, son against father, nephew against un-
cle, friend against friend to undermine the sanctity of the most private and confidential of all
conversations." Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. at 347 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Jimmy Hof-
fa's penumbral protection, however, failed to engage a majority of the Court.
245. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. at 303-04.
246. Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2402 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 2403 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("where the suspect is incarcerated, the constant
threat of physical danger peculiar to the prison environment may make him demonstrate his
toughness to other inmates by recounting or inventing past violent acts").
248. Id. at 2399-2401 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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prisoner," 249 the suspect still may get some relief from the privilege. In
that scenario, the suspect properly would perceive he was being com-
pelled to incriminate himself; his ignorance of his assailant's identity in
that instance would be irrelevant. 250 Absent such obvious indicia of
compulsion, however, the basis of exclusion, if any, would be the due
process clause, not the privilege.25 '
D. Summary
Considering the frequency with which the significant deprivations ele-
ment of Miranda's two-step analysis has been litigated, the interroga-
tion element has played a comparatively subordinate role in Supreme
Court jurisprudence. Although the Miranda majority seemed amenable
to including the functional equivalent of express questioning within its
protective ambit, the number of cases selected for Supreme Court re-
view has been conspicuously few. As a result, the Court's definition of
interrogation has had little chance to develop through repeated litiga-
tion.
In this context, Miranda's legacy is limited to Innis, Mauro, and
Perkins.2 5 2 Collectively, these cases reveal that even a presumption of
coercion requires at least some coercion before the presumption at-
taches in a given police-suspect encounter. Innis, still considered the
249. Id. at 2404 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall raised but did not answer the ques-
tion. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Perkins has been promptly felt in the lower courts. In Alexan-
der v. Connecticut, 876 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1989), a prisoner, serving a term for arson, confessed
to a visitor that he had committed a murder to keep the arson a secret. The visitor, angered by
the fact that the murder to which the prisoner confessed was of a long-time friend of his, went to
authorities. On a second visit, this time as a government agent, the visitor obtained a second
confession, replete with directions to the decomposing body. On habeas, the Second Circuit ex-
cluded the second confession. Alexander v. Connecticut, 876 F.2d at 283. On certiorari, the Su-
preme Court vacated and remanded to that court for reconsideration under Perkins. Meachum v.
Alexander, 110 S. Ct. 2607, 2607 (1990); Alexander v. Connecticut, 917 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1990)
(on remand) (denying petitioner's writ for habeas corpus on Perkins grounds).
250. Conversation with Donald Dripps, Professor of Law, University of Illinois (Dec. 27, 1990).
251. Due Process claims face an imposing legal standard. Police conduct must be "so offensive
as to deprive [the suspect] of . .. fundamental fairness," must be "violative of canons fundamen-
tal to the traditions and conscience of our people," Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934), and must be so "egregious," that it "so shocks the sensibilities of civilized society as to
warrant a federal intrusion on the criminal processes of the States." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 433-34 (1986).
252. Whatever educational value Brewer and Henry might otherwise have had was vitiated by
their failure to delve into the meaning of "interrogation," as neither case made any effort to
elaborate on the Court's cryptic statement in Innis that "the definitions of 'interrogation' under
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments . . . are not necessarily interchangeable." Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. at 300 n.4. Cf. Y. KAmsAR, KAmsAR ESSAYS, supra note 15 (treating Brewer as if Chris-




primary "interrogation" case, seemed at first to have broad implica-
tions, initially debunking the myth that police interrogation comes in
only one strand, then going so far as proscribing any words or actions
likely to elicit an incriminating response. The Court's own standard
seemingly would encompass the very tactics resorted to in that case.
But it did not, perhaps because one justice's "likelihood" is another's
"improbability." With the vagaries of police evaluations of the likeli-
hood of self-incrimination serving as a safety valve through which the
Court restricted its otherwise broad definition of interrogation, Innis's
major contribution to Miranda's notion of interrogation may be its ad-
monition that interrogation requires "a measure of compulsion above
and beyond that inherent in custody itself." 23 Although that observa-
tion properly alluded to the fifth amendment's compulsion requirement,
it offered no guidance as to how reviewing courts, prosecutors, or de-
fenders should prospectively distinguish the precise measure of compul-
sion which implicates Miranda from the "subtle coercion" 25 4 that does
not.
Mauro is the corner into which the Court painted itself in Innis. It is
highlighted by a debate among majority and dissenting justices that pit-
ted "possibility" against "reasonably likely" or even "highly proba-
ble," and the "subtle compulsion" of Innis against the even milder
compulsion found in Mauro, combined as well with the struggle to
weight the importance of police admissions of their subjective inten-
tions. Like Innis, Mauro's only contribution may be its reference to the
lack of "compelling influences, ' 2-" or police exploitation of "the coer-
cive nature of confinement to extract [a] confession." ' 256 The usefulness
of those decisions, therefore, may lie not in the unworkable likelihood
standard, but in their move toward insinuating the text of the privilege
- a proscription against compelled confessions - into Miranda.
That move is obvious in Perkins, where the application problems of
a "likelihood of incrimination" .standard yielded to a test cognizant of
the principles underlying the privilege. Adherence to those principles
would prohibit only those practices that create an environment of com-
pulsion, not those practices dependent on police officers' "reasonable
calculations" and on-the-spot evaluations of the "unusual susceptibili-
ties" of suspects. But because of its unique facts, Perkins will have
only negligible influence on Innis and Mauro. Its compulsion-based
standard, which Innis and Mauro anticipated, commands a narrow ap-
253. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300.
254. Id. at 303.
255. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. at 529.
256. Id. at 530.
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plication limited to undercover jail-plant interrogations. Thus, it re-
mains to be seen whether the Court openly will infuse a compulsion
element into its analysis or will seek the same result by continuing its
parsimonious application of the Innis standard.
III. A SYNERGISTIC MODEL OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
A. Three Approaches: Exclusivity, Interplay & Synergy
Given the difficulties of the distinct custody and interrogation inquir-
ies, the margin of error in judicial decisionmaking only worsens when,
as Miranda requires, both elements are evaluated in every instance. Re-
grettably, the "functional equivalent of arrest" 27 standard reviewed in
Part I, and Innis's "functional equivalent of interrogation ' 25 test re-
viewed in Part II confuse more than enlighten. Aside from their defi-
ciencies as standards for admissibility, neither obeys the need to view
custody and interrogation together. The result has been some questiona-
ble decisions. This Article suggests a new sensitivity to and revision of
Professor Kamisar's observation 2 9 - subsequently endorsed by the
Courtm - that it is "the interplay of custody and interrogation"'261
that "subjugate[s] [a suspect] to the will of his examiner." 262 With the
effects of interplay in mind, this Article attempts to offer a rough
method of measuring and illustrating those effects.263
When Justice Stewart wrote in Innis that "'interrogation' ... must
reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in
custody itself," he recognized how custody and interrogation work to-
gether to undermine a suspect's will to resist police pressures. 26 The
Court's holdings, however, before, after and in Innis itself, say other-
wise. A more accurate description of the Court's approach posits cus-
tody and interrogation as independent elements of police restraint, each
with its own requirements and variables, yet neither dependent on or
even influenced by the other.
257. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (suspect who is under arrest or its equivalent is
in custody for purposes of Miranda).
258. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing "interrogation").
259. See supra note 15 (discussing Kamisar's coining of term "interplay").
260. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 299.
261. Id.
262. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 457.
263. Absent any verifiably accurate method of measuring compulsion, any such attempt must
presume, as this Article does, that differences in degree of compulsion occasioned by various po-
lice tactics and custodial settings are discernible from the accounts rendered in appellate opinions.
264. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300.
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If viewed separately, as illustrated by the right-angled line on the
graph below, both elements must in each case reach a certain threshold
of compulsion before Miranda attaches. This describes the Court's ac-
tual practice, notwithstanding Justice Stewart's gesture in Innis quoted
above.265 To illustrate the Court's view, under which custody and inter-
rogation are considered as independent of one another, assume that on
the vertical axis, "10" represents the quantum of pressure that an in-
terrogation technique must exert on a suspect before the Innis standard
is met. Assume also that on the horizontal axis, "10" represents the
level of restraint necessary before a suspect can be said to be in cus-
tody or to have suffered a significant deprivation of freedom. The area
below the right-angled line illustrates the Court's field of legitimate po-
lice practices, while all practices falling on or above the line are per se
illegal.
Without accounting for the effect of custody and interrogation on
each other, the Court ignores that its own reference in Innis to "inter-
play" was a recognition of how both elements must be read together.
"Interplay" may mean that a high level of interrogation must be con-
sidered in evaluating the legal consequences of an otherwise low level
of custody, and that a high level of custody should inform the Court's
evaluation of an otherwise low level of interrogation. For example, in a
setting where one component is by itself insufficient to warrant Mir-
anda warnings but the other is highly compelling, the higher compo-
nent may compensate for the "shortcomings" of the component that
features a lower level of compulsion. Miranda, then, attaches whenever
both elements aggregately exert on a suspect a certain level of compul-
sion (in this case "20"), even if one element standing alone is below
that threshold. The three-sided line below illustrates such an integrated
or interplay theory, under which one highly compelling element is
viewed as capable of compensating for its co-element, which may be
lower than the Court would require when both elements are viewed in-
dependently. The admissibility results of an interplay perspective are
shown below, where points "A" and "B" represent lopsided encoun-
ters in which high-pressure police tactics on one axis are accompanied
by low-pressure tactics on the other. Both points illustrate scenarios
that would lead to statements admissible under the Court's view, but
inadmissible under an interplay approach.
It is just as possible, however, that rather than an interactive rela-
tionship, the Court's allusion to "interplay" may actually have envi-
sioned a synergistic relationship. "Synergy" describes how two forces,
265. Supra note 264 and accompanying text.
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acting together, create a whole system in which each element acts in a
manner unpredicted by the behavior of its parts taken separately. 26 It
has been defined as "the combined action of two or more agents (as
drugs) that is greater than the sum of the action of one of the agents
used alone, ' 267 and describes, for example, how metals such as chrome-
nickel-steel have a tensile strength that well exceeds the cumulative
strength of its three links."
Accordingly, the curved line depicts the synergy theory, positing not
only that one component can compensate for its lower-level analogue,
but that in some instances, both elements work together to coerce a
suspect even though, if represented graphically, both elements would
fall below the Court's threshold. A synergy view, unlike an interplay
perspective, views each element as augmenting the other, rather than
merely being added to the other. The grated area between the synergy
and interplay lines, therefore, like the grated area between interplay
and the Court's actual practice, represents the settings in which police
practices that would be impermissible under the former would be allow-
able under the latter. 9 Under both those views, police, when imposing
a severe level of custodial restraint on a suspect, excite in the suspect a
heightened sensitivity to whatever interrogation techniques are used. In
contrast, a low level of custodial restraint affords police greater leeway
in interrogating a suspect before Miranda warnings become necessary. 270
At least three views therefore might characterize the custodial interro-
gation dynamic: synergy, interplay, and exclusivity. These three perspec-
tives are illustrated below.
266. See R.B. FuuLER, SYERiaETIcs: EXPLonATION i Tm GsommTRY or THairKNo 3 (1975) (de-,
fining "synergy").
267. WEsma's INTENATioNAL DIcTioNAoR UNABmOE 2320 (3d ed. 1961) (defining "syner-
gism").
268. R.B. FuuLa, supra note 266, at 6.
269. It may be important to note that the lines on both axes where the. synergy curve and
interplay line intersect never touch the axes. This is because there must always be at least some
level of compulsion exerted by both components, custody and interrogation. There comes a point,
however, where one component, if ridiculously severe enough, would make analysis of the other
component unnecessary. For example, a custodial restraint in the form of severe beating and tor-
ture eventually would moot any inquiries into whether the suspect had also been interrogated.
270. Of course, the converse also is true. High or low levels of interrogation also inform the
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In reconsidering the cases analyzed in Parts I and II, all facts rele-
vant to either component of police restraint take on aggravating or
mitigating characteristics. For instance, a brief encounter tends to miti-
gate the level of compulsion exerted on a suspect, while a prolonged
encounter would have the opposite effect. Other mitigating or aggravat-
ing factors turn on the number of officers present, the time of day at
which the encounter occurs, and whether the suspect is alone or with
his entourage, or visible or isolated from public view.
The relative weight accorded to each of these factors admittedly is
difficult to assign. For example, if 4:00 a.m. is compelling (Orozco),271
then what about midnight? 10:00 p.m.? 8:00 a.m.? (Beckwith)?212 Is it
ever non-compelling to be questioned by police? How many officers
does it take to overwhelm a suspect's will? How about an army of
271. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. at 325 (concluding that suspect was in custody when police
questioned him in his bedroom at 4:00 a.m.).
272. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. at 342 (concluding that unwarned suspect not in
custody when IRS agents interrogated him at 8:00 a.m. in private home).
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polite officers intent on observing the suspect's constitutional rights?
Conversely, could not one Dirty Harry overcome a reasonable person's
will to remain silent or, at a minimum, cloud that person's decision as
to how to proceed? How many family members, friends, or passersby
does it take to create a protective shield for the average suspect? Pas-
sersby range from concerned citizens troubled by police abuse to un-
easy citizens interested primarily in avoiding that which does not
concern them. Should defendants be permitted to produce stopwatches
at trial in order to buttress their claims that officers wore down their
will? Officers could ask many questions, all of them innocuous, thus
adding nothing coercive to the encounter. Similarly, brevity is not nec-
essarily the soul of noncustodial questioning. The right question ("Hey,
wait a minute you - did you steal that property?") asked at the right
time by the right officer could create a coercive environment in a mat-
ter of seconds.
In evaluating the aggravating or mitigating impact of a given fact,
judges must choose which element - custody, interrogation, or both
- is affected. Again, the duration of an encounter portrays the type
of classification choice necessary under the synergy model. Duration is
relevant to both custody and interrogation. Through protracted interro-
gation, police convey to the suspect that they are intent on "making
him talk." So too, through a lengthy deprivation of freedom, police
employ a form of physical intimidation that increases the suspect's anx-
iety and thus makes his cooperation more likely. Although in the syn-
ergy model duration is relevant to both elements, most facts are less
versatile and therefore are more easily attributable to one component
or the other.
In some instances, application of the synergy theory becomes more
difficult due to the Court's customary practice of giving short shrift to
one of the two elements of custodial interrogation. In Innis, for exam-
ple, the Court, in its effort to give content to "interrogation," glossed
over the effects that custody may have had on the suspect. In Mathia-
son, the Court's preoccupation with the custody issue crowded out any
consideration of what interrogation techniques were used. This diffi-
culty notwithstanding, this Article assumes that neither component is
necessarily a greater source of compulsion than the other. There is
some evidence, however, that the cases that have reached the Court
challenge this presumption of parity. In no case have police exposed a
suspect to the type of lengthy interrogation typical of pre-Miranda
practices. 273 With the exception of Beckwith, where IRS agents lingered
273. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. at 149 (Court, on due process grounds, reversed
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at the suspect's house for over three hours,27 4 the lengthiest encounter
spanned a half hour. 27 As a result, the tug exerted solely by police
interrogation is relatively mild in virtually every case, at least when
compared with historical practice. This asymmetry, however, is due
more to the fortuity of the facts raised in petitions. for certiorari than
in any notion that physical restraint is more compelling than pesky
badgering.
The trick, as may already be apparent, is in measuring the impact of
synergy. What level of custodial restraint is necessary to escalate an
otherwise mild interrogation to Miranda's threshold? Which mitigating
factors outweigh which aggravating factors? These questions raise legiti-
mate concerns, and reveal that the synergy model cannot realistically
supply more than a rough substitute for a necessarily nontechnical judi-
cial determination. Yet these criticisms overestimate the intended scope
of the synergy model, which aspires only to a more integrative inquiry
than that recognized in Supreme Court opinions, opinions in which the
Court cannot in any event escape from weighing the relative impor-
tance of competing facts relevant to the issue of custodial interroga-
tion.
This approach may recall the fact-specific subjectivity of the old vol-
untariness doctrine, under which courts assessed whether under the "to-
tality of the circumstances" a confession was voluntary. By proposing
an atavistic approach to confessions law, however, I do not suggest
that repackaging an abandoned test would simplify the difficult Mir-
anda doctrine. Such an approach would, however, do explicitly what
the Court's gestalt method does implicitly, that is, weigh the relevant
facts in determining whether police subjected a suspect to custodial in-
terrogation.
Because a reviewing court's assessment of whether a suspect is enti-
tled to Miranda's presumption of compulsion requires the presence of
some uncertain measure of compulsion before the presumption attaches,
a judicial decision as to inclusion, exclusion, and the relative weight of
each fact is necessary. Just as some facts are relevant to that assess-
ment and others are not, some facts tend to increase compulsion while
state court conviction of defendant who, "from Saturday evening at seven o'clock until Monday
morning at approximately nine-thirty never left th[e] homicide room on the fifth floor"). Operat-
ing in rotating teams in order to avoid exhausting the interrogators, police managed to perpetuate
a nonstop, two-day interrogation that afforded Ashcraft a total of five minutes rest. Id.
274. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. at 342-43 (agents arrived at private residence at
8:00 a.m. and left about 11:00 a.m.).
275. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 (police questioning elicited confession in first
five minutes of 30-minute encounter).
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others tend to dissipate it. The Court's method avoids the vagaries of
measuring compulsion only by papering over it. The synergy approach
simply unpacks the otherwise invisible measurement of compulsion.
For police, on the other hand, synergy requires that they warn more
suspects. If intimidating custodial settings make all words or actions
compelling, and all lengthy or menacing interrogations make any level
of custodial restraing appear intimidating, then police should warn any-
one whose freedom they have restrained and about whose apparently
criminal conduct police would like to inquire or comment. If this
sounds no easier to apply than the Court's current test, then to avoid
exclusion, self-interested police should over- rather than underinclusively
issue warnings. For every suspect who is subject to only a gentle nudge
from police but chooses to remain silent only after police alert him
that he need not slice his throat with his own tongue, is a suspect
whom police coerced but who would have waived and confessed had he
received warnings. Thus police gain as much as they lose through more
generously issuing warnings.
The Court's practice of looking at only one element of the custodial
interrogation dynamic at a time comes at the expense of accuracy. Of
the nine fifth amendment cases considered in this Article, only the first
three - Mathis, Orozco, and Beckwith - were decided correctly. In
Mathis and Orozco, the confessions were viewed as inadmissible even
without reference to the interactive nature of custody and interrogation.
In Beckwith, on the other hand, the Court also reached the correct
result, but for the wrong reasons. Two later cases - Berkemer and
Perkins - purport to be aberrational, thus cannot fairly be evaluated
in terms of their fidelity to strict Miranda doctrine (except to whatever
extent all exceptions betray some infidelity to the doctrine from which
they deviate). And finally, four cases - Mathiason, Beheler, Innis, and
Mauro - all decided erroneously, would in each case have been de-
cided differently had the Court considered the synergistic relationship
of custody and interrogation. This section of the Article reconsiders the
cases presented in Parts I and II, this time suggesting a method of
analysis that could in some instances have led the Court to results dif-
ferent than those actually achieved. Graphic depiction of how three dif-
ferent approaches - the Court's exclusivity view, interplay, and
synergy - would influence the nine cases analyzed in this Article ap-
pears in the Appendix.
B. The Early Cases
What follows is a critique, fashioned in light of the proposed model,
of the significant Miranda cases reviewed above. Only in the early
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cases, Mathis and Orozco, did the Court invalidate police methods of
obtaining incriminating evidence. Although the Court secretly may have
had interplay or something like it in mind, the absence in both terse
opinions of any reference to interplay or its equivalent weakens any
such argument. Instead, the better view is that the custody and interro-
gation elements, taken separately, reached the threshold requirement of
Miranda. Further, Mathis and Orozco comprise the Court's immediate,
post-Miranda approach to confessions, an approach that deferred to
Miranda's strictures in a literal sense. After Mathis and Orozco, how-
ever, Miranda's literalism was supplanted by a standard that demands
that the case have a certain Miranda-like quality before Miranda's pro-
tections kick in.
The IRS agent in Mathis asked the suspect only two questions in
each of two encounters some four months apart.2 6 This, however, does
not immunize the questioning from being classified as "interrogation,"
even though only one question in each instance - whether Mathis had
prepared and signed his tax return - was potentially incriminating.2"
The interrogation bore little resemblance to the prolonged, incessant
grilling that concerned the Court in Miranda. But brevity does not by
itself render police tactics noncoercive. With one properly fashioned
question, police can call for an incriminating response without resorting
to gradually wearing down the will of the interrogatee. Nevertheless,
for purposes of illustrating the custodial interrogation dynamic, brief
questioning is considered a mitigating factor. No doubt the IRS agent
could have increased the level of compulsion on Mathis through more
persistent questioning. But persistent questioning was unnecessary. One
question obviously calling for an incriminating response still is suffi-
cient to satisfy the Miranda interrogation standard.
Because incarceration is an extremely compelling type of restraint,
the custody level also was high in Mathis. This observation, however,
is not without its opponents. It has been argued that as an inmate in
the Florida State Penitentiary, Mathis was not "swept from familiar
surroundings into police custody. ' 278 He was not "swept" anywhere.
For the time being, Mathis was "at home" in prison and arguably de-
served no greater protection than would an unconvicted citizen ques-
276. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. at 3 n.2.
277. The other question in both interviews - whether Mathis would voluntarily extend the stat-
ute of limitations for any cause of action that the IRS may have against him - did not call for
an incriminating response. Id. at 6 n.1 (White, J., dissenting); see Mathis v. United States, 376
F.2d 595, 596 (5th Cir. 1967) (defendant agreed to sign Form 872 extending limitations period),
rev'd, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
278. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 461.
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tioned by IRS agents at home. Sitting in a cell, answering two
questions from one IRS agent evokes an image different in kind and
degree from stock Miranda scenarios. Mathis's familiarity with prison
surroundings, however, was a fact "too minor and shadowy" to have
swayed the majority.2 79
As a result, Mathis endured a significant deprivation of freedom. 21°
Confined to a small cell, there was nothing he could do to avoid the
"antagonistic forces" that the federal agents represented.281 Moreover, a
prisoner in Mathis's shoes might. perceive (or misperceive) that his co-
operation or resistance would affect his inmate status, thus compelling
him to cooperate with authorities. 28 If so, then any familiarity that an
inmate experiences is offset by his perceived need to comply. Accord-
ingly, the Court properly entitled Mathis to the presumption that being
interrogated in a prison cell compromised his will to resist the pressures
to incriminate himself.
From law enforcement's viewpoint, Mathis was a no-win situation. If
incarceration is presumptively coercive, then the agents were precluded
from asking Mathis anything without first issuing him Miranda warn-
ings. In custodial settings, officers are on thin ice and are precluded
from using techniques of persuasion that might be acceptable elsewhere.
The IRS agents, merely by showing up at the Florida State Peniten-
tiary, were required to warn Mathis before questioning him. 8 3 Thus, a
theory of exclusivity, under which both custody and interrogation sepa-
rately reached the minimum threshold necessary to satisfy Miranda, ex-
plains the result in Mathis.2"
279. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. at 4. Incarceration on an unrelated charge thus creates a
perpetual state of custody, even though the questioning officers did nothing to create that condi-
tion.
280. In light of all the penalties, stated and unstated, endemic to prison life, to view a prisoner
in a perpetual custodial state does not seem to ask much of the law. As a fiction, it is easily
justified; as a benefit, its value is only marginal to the suspect.
281. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 461.
282. Once Mathis figured out what was going on, his desire to avoid self-incrimination became
clear. In a third interview, three months after the second, the agent returned, this time with an
agent of the IRS Intelligence Division. United States v. Mathis, 376 F.2d at 596. The purpose of
the visit was to interview Mathis about the pending criminal investigation. After being advised of
his constitutional rights, Mathis "refused to cooperate further." Id. Although the Supreme Court
redacted the third interview from its opinion, Mathis's invocation of rights proves that he would
not have incriminated himself had he been apprised earlier of his constitutional rights. This fact,
however, says nothing about the level of compulsion created by the officers in the earlier inter-
views.
283. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. at 348-49 (Marshall, J., concurring) (almost com-
plete warnings saved IRS agents from what may otherwise have been Miranda violation).
284. If it were determined that incarceration on an unrelated charge was not "too minor and
shadowy" to make a difference to the Court, synergy certainly would require warnings. The fact
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Orozco, too, is explainable by viewing each component indepen-
dently. On the custody side, the sudden appearance of four uniformed
officers at 4:00 a.m. in his bedroom justifiably led Orozco to believe
he was not free to go.285 Yet it is unclear why a suspect who is being
questioned at home would want to go anywhere. In the context of
nonstationhouse interrogation, particularly at-home interrogation, the
significant deprivation of freedom well may take the form of a prohibi-
tion on the suspect's freedom to expel the meddling officers rather
than the freedom to banish himself from his own castle. Although the
mere aura of blue uniforms "without more" is insufficient to satisfy
Miranda,'26 four uniformed officers barging into Orozco's one-room
apartment instantly converted his dwelling place into a mini-station-
house, placing on him the same police-dominated influences that so
concerned the Miranda Court.
The late hour also aggravated the level of restraint on Orozco. Police
cannot plan the time of day that criminals violate the law, but they are
answerable for the increased anxiety that the timing of their visits
causes. Together, these aggravating factors were not offset by the brev-
ity of the encounter (several minutes from start to finish), home-field
advantage, and absence of indicia of actual custody, e.g., drawn weap-
ons, handcuffing, or other forms of physical intimidation.
8 7
The interrogation axis also reflects questioning well above the re-
quired minimum for Miranda. Three of the four questions asked for
highly incriminating evidence - only the first question ("What's your
name?") did not.28 As a result, with each component taken separately,
Orozco falls slightly above the minimum amount of compulsion neces-
sary to require Miranda warnings. The interrogation resembled that in
Mathis - brief but to the point. Assuming Orozco was correctly de-
cided, then there, as in Mathis, both the level of questioning and cus-
todial restraint were sufficient to reach Miranda's threshold, even
without resorting to synergy.
that they subjected him to direct questioning, albeit brief, in a restrictive yet familiar setting,
heightened the level of custodial restraint upon the suspect. In an atmosphere that already fea-
tured some level of restriction, the combination of that condition with direct questioning under
Innis put Mathis over the edge of permissible police practices.
285. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. at 325.
286. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 ("[a]ny interview of one suspected of a crime
by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it," but "police officers are not required to
administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question").
287. Police testified that they were admitted to Orozco's roominghouse by a lady who answered
their knock at the door and "invited" them in. Orozco v. State, 428 S.W.2d 666, 671-72 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1967). This was a mitigating factor in the state's view, but not in the Supreme
Court's view, who did not even mention that fact in their opinion.
288. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (detailing the questions police asked Orozco).
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C. The Middle Years
In the middle years, the Court correctly decided Beckwith (but for
the wrong reasons), and erred in Mathiason and Beheler for failure to
appreciate the forces of synergy in those cases. The level of compulsion
in Beckwith was measurably lower than in its predecessors. The Court's
holding, however, which affirmed the federal district court's admission
into evidence of the suspect's incriminating statements, ignored the
most relevant fact in the case.
On the custody axis, the mitigating factor most crucial to the Court's
holding was the at-home locale of the encounter.2 9 Other mitigating
factors were: the neither too early nor too late 8:00 a.m. hour (meant
to avoid embarrassing Beckwith at work), 290 the "friendly and relaxed"
atmosphere of a dining-room "interview," 291 and the fact that only two
plainclothes IRS agents conducted the interrogation.292 The sole aggra-
vating factor on the custody axis was the duration of the questioning;
the agents stayed for three hours.293
The interrogation level also was mitigated by the "friendly and re-
laxed" atmosphere, and aggravated by the prolonged questioning. 29 But
the warnings, which seem to be the most obvious mitigating factor and
which go to both custody and interrogation, played no role whatsoever
in the majority's opinion. 295 The agents issued Beckwith a nearly full
panoply of warnings, omitting only an indigent's right to appointed
counsel. 296 Those warnings, although technically imperfect, largely dis-
pelled the pull that both the questioning and the restraint of freedom
exerted on the suspect. Absent the warnings, Beckwith becomes diffi-
cult to distinguish from Orozco, unless, that is, concededly irrelevant
factors such as the suspect's level of sophistication29 or the seriousness
289. That Beckwith was at a private home "where [he] occasionally stayed," rather than at his
own home, is a distinction without a difference. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. at 349 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in the judgment).
290. Id. at 342. Having police visit one at work can be the source of great anxiety, and no-
where is that anxiety better portrayed than in Kafka's THE TAL, in which Josef K.'s status and
reputation as chief clerk of a bank is seriously compromised when his co-workers witness his
public dealings with police. F. KArIA, Tgs TuiA.L (W. Muir & E. Muir trans. 1968).
291. The majority pointed out that the polite agents formally introduced themselves to Beckwith
before questioning him. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. at 342-43.
292. Id. at 342.
293. Id. at 341.
294. Id.
295. It did, however, play a critical role in Justice Marshall's brief concurring opinion, id. at
349 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment), and in Judge Bazelon's opinion in United States
v. Beckwith, 510 F.2d 741, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
296. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. at 421.
297. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 469 (level of suspect's sophistication irrelevant to
applicability of prophylactic warnings).
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of the offense298 are considered in the calculus. Had the agents failed
to warn Beckwith, distinguishing Orozco from Beckwith would require
pitting a 4:00 a.m., brief, at-home interrogation, conducted by four
uniformed officers against an 8:00 a.m., lengthy, at-home interrogation
conducted by two friendly plainclothes federal agents. Such a distinc-
tion is too close to draw intelligently. As a result, the Court's failure
to acknowledge the warnings that were present in Beckwith but absent
in Orozco indicates that in the former, the Court may have reached the
correct result, but for the wrong reasons.
The need for the synergy theory is most apparent in Oregon v. Ma-
thiason.299 There, the Court adressed only the custody element, holding
that it fell short of Miranda's threshold.3a 0 The Court's conclusion that
Mathiason's freedom had not been deprived in any significant way is
difficult to defend.
Mathiason encountered police behind closed doors in a state highway
patrol office, where the police radio played audibly from another
room. 01 These aggravating factors are mitigated somewhat by the rela-
tively nonconfrontational manner in which police arranged the meeting,
including the fact that Mathiason drove himself to the stationhouse.
The Supreme Court seemed persuaded by the officer's admonition,
"you're not under arrest," 0 2 but those words, however meaningful to a
lawyer, are, without some explanation, meaningless to most suspects
and thus are irrelevant to the level of police restraint. The Court's will-
ingness to credit the officer's hollow admonition, and its refusal to
weight Mathiason's parolee status, were unreasonable. Accepting these
choices arguendo, however, this Article acknowledges the mitigating in-
fluence of the admonition, and ignores Mathiason's status as a parolee
who arguably lived in a perpetual state of custody.3 3
Addressing the interrogation element, both the Oregon and United
States reporters described the encounter as functional-equivalent interro-
gation rather than express questioning. The officer's statements in Ma-
thiason contained "everything but a question mark." 314 He opened by
expressing his wish "to talk about a burglary," about which he falsely
298. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 429-35 (misdemeanor no less than felony offenses
deserve Miranda warnings when police interrogate suspect in custodial setting).
299. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
300. Id. at 495.
301. Id. at 493.
302. Id.
303. But see Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429-34 (rejecting Murphy's claim that proba-
tioner is subject to "restrictive conditions governing various aspects of his life" equivalent to
"custody"); see also supra note 89 (discussing Murphy).
304. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 311 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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claimed to have proof of Mathiason's involvement, then offered that
Mathiason's truthfulness would be considered favorably by authori-
ties. 05 Not surprisingly,3°6 Mathiason broke down and confessed within
five minutes. 3°7 The mitigating effect of the brevity of the interrogation
is substantial, but should not take the case out of the reach of Mir-
anda.
Had the Court considered the interplay of custody and interrogation,
it would have held the confession inadmissible. Police placed Mathiason
in an untenable position. The officer's polite introduction - telephon-
ing the suspect and leaving his business card - meant nothing once he
closed the door to the small room and seated himself across a desk
from the suspectY°8 That setting is facially distinguishable from a com-
paratively modest at-home encounter. The interrogation took place in
the very place that concerned the Miranda Court most.3 °9 The officer
summoned Mathiason to the police station, not to a local restaurant or
other less threatening environment, sequestered him, and told him that
police knew he had committed a burglary.310 Even if one were to ac-
cept that neither component taken separately violated Miranda, the of-
ficer's statements must be assessed in light of the pre-questioning
deprivation of freedom he had imposed on Mathiason.
When confronted with the officer's apparent knowledge that he had
committed a burglary, Mathiason was alone, seated in a small room in
a police station. Just as the officer's statements were enhanced by their
locale, the statements themselves exerted pressure on Mathiason above
and beyond the custodial restraint .3 1 Nothing in the encounter, includ-
ing admonitions based on technical terms of art such as "arrest" or
"not under arrest," dispelled the compulsion caused by the dual re-
straint that Mathiason endured. The impact of custody and interroga-
305. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 493. As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent, the ma-
jority ignored the Miranda Court's express disapproval of these types of "deceptive stratagems."
Id. at 496 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 455).
306. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 468 n.37 (quoting P. DEVLIN, THE CIuIANA PRosE-
cUTioN IN ENGLAND 32 (1958)) (noting that people generally believe that they must answer all
questions officer asks); see also supra note 34 and accompanying text (same).
307. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 493.
308. Id.
309. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 455 (noting that compulsion to speak in isolated
setting of police station is much greater than in other settings).
310. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 493.
311. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 (holding that interrogation "must reflect a
measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself."). Yet, because a custo-
dial setting "carries its own badge of intimidation," custody should alert police to the presence of




tion, operating together, would have been mitigated in a less
compelling locale, or if the officer had been less overtly accusatory. As
it was, however, the officer's failure to administer Miranda warnings to
Mathiason was error.
For essentially the same reasons, the next case, California v. Be-
heler,12 also missed the mark. Beheler contains a different set of aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances that the Court likewise dismissed as
irrelevant. For example, the Court believed it unimportant that Beheler
was in a drunken, emotionally distraught condition.313 Yet only three
years earlier in Innis, Justice Stewart had considered the same "irrele-
vant" indicia of the suspect's state of mind as relevant to the Court's
holding. 1 4 In assessing whether Innis was "particularly susceptible" to
the handicapped-children ploy, Justice Stewart said there was no indica-
tion to police that Innis was "unusually disoriented or upset." 3"
If being "unusually disoriented" is in fact relevant, then Beheler's
drunken stupor - he "drank a couple of cases of beer during the
day" in addition to the quarts purchased and imbibed after "four or
five" trips to the liquor store that night - certainly should qualify.3t 6
As for being unusually upset, even the Supreme Court's watered-down
version of the California Court of Appeal's description of Beheler's
condition concedes that he was "emotionally distraught. ' 317 What was
relevant to whether the police conduct in Innis was interrogation had
become irrelevant to whether the suspect was in custody in Beheler.
Whether a suspect is disoriented or upset should be relevant to both
Miranda inquiries.
On the custody issue, mitigating factors pervade Beheler.' Initial po-
lice-suspect contact occurred in a nonconfrontational manner. Unlike
Mathiason, who drove himself to meet the police, Beheler initiated con-
tact with the police when he called to report the incident. If Mathiason
remains good law, then under the Court's approach the custody level
in Beheler would not command Miranda warnings.
The Court implied that Beheler waived a certain level of protection
by initiating contact with the police. That is, because Beheler called the
police to tell them that his half-brother had committed a murder, he
312. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per curiam).
313. Id. at 1124-25.
314. Rhode Island v Innis, 446 U.S. at 302-03.
315. Id. at 303.
316. People v. Beheler, 200 Cal. Rptr. 195, 199 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (on remand from Califor-
nia v.,Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983)). The California court offers a detailed account of the events
leading to Peggy Dean's murder. Id. at 196-99.
317. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1124-25.
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demonstrated his desire to be taken to the stationhouse for a half-hour
interrogation leading to his confession to having been an accomplice.2 8
By asserting that after he heard he "was not under arrest," Beheler
"voluntarily agreed to accompany police to the station house," the
Court subtly constructed a waiver theory. 19 If Beheler really wanted
constitutional protection, the argument goes, he would have volunteered
no information to police. Instead, he would have forced them to find
him out through standard investigative techniques. By initiating contact,
he betrayed a willingness to confess, which required only a dose of
custodial interrogation to coax out of him.
The half-hour "interview" presumably was interrogation under any
view of Miranda or Innis. Although the reporters are silent on the
tenor of police questioning, little could go on in a half-hour "inter-
view" that would not offend Innis or Miranda's notions of interroga-
tion. Had there not been interrogation, the Court surely would have
seized the opportunity to say so. If the presence of interrogation is a
given in Beheler, then arguing even under the Court's test that Beheler
was not in custody demands that one accept the Court's implication
that the suspect somehow waived his rights.
The Court's waiver theory is unsound. Beheler volunteered to tell po-
lice that someone else had committed a crime and had hidden the
weapon. He never said, as Miranda clearly permits, that he wished to
confess to a crime. Any sense of Beheler's desire to implicate himself
surfaced only after a police-initiated trip to the stationhouse. Accord-
ingly, Beheler's "waiver" existed more in the minds of the police and
the six Justices comprising the majority than in the facts themselves.
Even for those who may be persuaded that Beheler's phone call to
police mitigated the level of compulsion that he suffered, the effects of
synergy reveal that the subsequent stationhouse interrogation offset
whatever mitigating effect Beheler's phone call may have had. The
Court's opinion failed to ascribe any legal significance to the half-hour
stationhouse interrogation that Beheler endured. A classic, Miranda-like
encounter with an intoxicated, emotionally distraught suspect does not
become a benign setting or a volunteered confession simply because of
how police happened upon the suspect.
At this point, crime-control theorists might ask whether the police
realistically had any alternative in Beheler. Their alternative was to re-
318. Beheler's half-brother, Dannie Willbanks, was the trigger man. Beheler called police from a
neighbor's house hours after the crime occurred. People v. Beheler, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 196, 198.
319. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1122. In essence, it resembles the Court's reasoning in
Mathiason, where the suspect surrendered a certain measure of protection by driving himself to a
"convenient" "interview" at the local highway patrol office. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at
493 (quoting People v. Mathiason, 275 Or. 1, 3-4, 549 P.2d 673, 674 (1976)).
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spect the inherently coercive nature of stationhouse encounters. Any
stationhouse interaction with a suspect should automatically alert police
to carefully circumscribe their interrogation practices. The notion that
Beheler had voluntarily placed himself in the charge of police would be
much more convincing had he confessed at home or, for that matter,
anywhere other than the stationhouse. Once the police, at their request,
took the suspect to the stationhouse, anything they said or did would
enhance the level of compulsion exerted on him. Compulsion is pre-
sumed to be an unavoidable consequence of that particular locale. De-
spite the passive role of the police in the events initially leading them
to Beheler, the synergistic effect of a stationhouse setting coupled with
a half-hour interrogation increased the level of compulsion to a point
of requiring the police to administer Miranda warnings.
D. The Later Cases
Berkemer, a unanimous decision, is best understood by inferring a
subtext in which police, in order to fulfill their publicly mandated mis-
sion to clean up our highways, must be afforded an exception to the
bright line Miranda rule. Like the public safety exception decided the
same term in New York v. Quarles,3 2" it apparently constituted only a
modest departure from accepted practice for the Court to delineate an
exception for traffic stops.3 21
The Court was quite candid about its intent to deviate from strict
Miranda doctrine. Rather than argue that the suspect was not subjected
to custodial interrogation, the Court reasoned that a common-sense ex-
ception to Miranda was appropriate, presumably in order to pursue le-
gitimate law enforcement goals and to avoid the absurd results that
blind-faith adherence to technical rules can cause. All licensed drivers
know that roadside traffic stops are brief encounters typically ending
with the driver going on his or her way with a ticket or a warning. 3 "
That knowledge dispels a great deal of the anxiety endemic to encoun-
ters with authorities. The familiarity of the process, however, says
nothing about a motorist's perception of encounters that can and do
lead to full-fledged arrest. In those cases, where the suspect has com-
mitted an offense that calls for a prolonged encounter - the Court's
rationale erodes. The brevity of the encounter, therefore, is a function
320. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
321. This is particularly so since the groundwork had already been laid in an analogous fourth
amendment context in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968) (permitting pat-down search on
less than probable cause to insure police safety), which later was extended to automobile 'Stops in
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
322. Berkerner v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 436-38.
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of the basis of the encounter. Hit-and-run or drunk drivers harbor no
realistic expectation of brief encounters with police.
Yet the Court seemed unconcerned with potentially lengthy roadside
stops leading to full-blown arrests. Only when the encounter shifts to
an arrest-equivalent does the motorist receive Miranda's protections.
Even the Court admitted that with this invisible triggering point, "po-
lice and lower courts will continue occasionally to have difficulty decid-
ing exactly when a suspect has been taken into custody. 3 2 Thus, the
new roadside traffic stop exception was intentionally overbroad, its ov-
erbreadth a necessary cost of obtaining and preserving confessions from
drunk drivers. The Court admitted that McCarty had suffered a signifi-
cant deprivation of freedom. Similarly, the questioning that occurred
after his arrest, which was nearly identical to the roadside questioning,
was held to be interrogation. The Court therefore confirmed the pres-
ence of Miranda's two components but held that Miranda was not im-
portant in this limited class of cases. In so holding, the Court mooted
analysis under either model, exclusivity or synergy. In essence, the
Court admitted to altering strict Miranda doctrine.
Innis, more than any other decision, demonstrates the Court's one-
component-at-a-time approach. Although Justice Stewart noted that
compulsion can result from the interplay of custody and interrogation,
his majority opinion nevertheless ignored what effect, if any, the fact
of custody had in concert with the handicapped-children ploy on a sus-
pect who had no choice but to listen to the officers' conversation while
handcuffed in the back of a caged police wagon.
The officers' dialogue clearly "reflect[ed] a measure of compulsion
above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.' ' 32 That "measure,"
however, was insufficient to meet the Court's standard. The Court
could not have so concluded if it also considered the natural anxieties
and pressures attendant to a 4:30 a.m. post-arrest police escort. An on-
the-street handicapped-children dialogue, absent the handcuffs, where
Innis would have been less the captive and more the casual listener,
still would have significantly restricted Innis's freedom, but not to the
same extent. Even with the forces of synergy at work, an on-the-street
restraint, coupled with the officers' interrogation tactics, might have
evaded the reach of Miranda. As it was, however, an extremely com-
pelling custodial restraint colored the officers' conversation in a way
that aggravated the level of compulsion, and reached Miranda's thresh-
old.
323. Id. at 441.
324. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300.
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Innis's successor, Arizona v. Mauro,31s likewise discounted the syner-
gistic relationship between custody and interrogation. Because Detective
Manson's presence, made slightly more compelling by his tape-recorder,
exerted only a gentle nudge, not a tug, on Mr. Mauro, the Court held
that Miranda's threshold was not met.3 s From a synergy perspective,
the critical question was whether the fact of custody escalated the vo-
yeuristic officer's conduct to the point of interrogation.
While holding Mr. and Mrs. Mauro in custody inside the station-
house, the Flagstaff Police Department was constrained at a heightened
level from engaging in any conduct that might be construed as interro-
gation. Thus, even accepting the Court's holding that the orchestrated,
tape-recorded, police-witnessed conversation between two distraught co-
suspects was permissible under Innis, an element crucial to the Court's
interrogation inquiry - the fact of custody - was afforded no weight.
Assume, for instance, that the officers had visited the Mauros at
home rather than in jail. Even in the unlikely event that a tape-re-
corded conversation would occur in such a setting, the compulsion to
speak would lessen considerably. The discrepancy in compulsion from
jailhouse to living room flows from the officers' diminished control
over their captives. At the stationhouse, the suspects' vulnerability in-
creases because of their isolation and uncertainty about what might
happen to them. The setting itself "carries its own badge of intimida-
tion. "327 In a more relaxed setting, where the officers' possible courses
of action seem less threatening, and the pangs of sequestration are con-
spicuously absent, the couple's perceived need to confer at that mo-
ment, even if recorded and witnessed by police, is reduced. Synergy
recognizes such a distinction as a mitigating factor. As it was, however,
the officers conducted themselves with little respect for their locale. As
benign as the tape-recorder ploy was in the view of the five Justices of
the majority, it was nothing of the sort when viewed together with the
forces of custody that played upon the suspects' wills to remain silent.
Application of the synergy theory to Illinois v. Perkins32 leads to
two possible explanations of the outcome in that case. First, Perkins
could stand for the proposition that in all cases Miranda's two-step in-
quiry now includes a third step - an inquiry into the compulsion level
created by police. Such a departure from Miranda's presumption is un-
likely, even under the present composition of the Court. The second
rationale, that the compulsion-based approach is limited to the interro-
325. 481 U.S. 520 (1987).
326. Id. at 527.
327. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 457.
328. 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
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gation element in reviewing confessions obtained in undercover jail-
plant interrogations of incarcerated suspects, is more likely the reading
of Perkins that will result. In this sense, Perkins, like Berkemer and
Quarles before it, is an exception to Miranda, whether couched as such
or not.
Perkins clearly was in custody, even though the Solicitor General ar-
gued to the contrary. 329 The mitigating effect of the familiar surround-
ings is more pronounced in the living room of a suspect surrounded by
his entourage 3 0 than in an 8' x 10' cell, surrounded by prison hacks.
Similarly, in Perkins police conducted one of the most direct interroga-
tions ever reviewed in the post-Miranda era. Because in Perkins the
custody and interrogation levels undoubtedly call for warnings under a
strict reading of Miranda, only through an exception to Miranda, in
this case a noncompulsion-based exception to the interrogation compo-
nent, could the Court's determination that warnings were unnecessary
be justified.
E. Summary
In the initial stages of application, the Court's approach proceeded
without unjust results. In Mathis and Orozco, officials exposed the sus-
pects to qualifying levels of compulsion on the custody and interroga-
tion axes. The first case decided after Mathis and Orozco also reached
the correct result. In Beckwith, it is difficult to conceive how the Court
got there, considering that no credence was given to the mitigating ef-
fect of the almost-complete warnings that the IRS agent administered
to Beckwith before questioning him. Thus, in that case Miranda had
not attached despite the forces of synergy. From that point on, how-
ever, the cost of the Court's exclusivity approach became evident.
Whereas Mathis, Orozco, and Beckwith were correctly decided de-
spite shortcomings in the Court's approach, in the subsequent cases the
exclusivity approach led to the admission of otherwise inadmissible evi-
dence. First came Mathiason and Beheler, in which the Court heavily
weighted various factors relevant to the level of compulsion while sub-
ordinating others that it previously had viewed as relevant. The Court
consequently denigrated the custodial restraint in those cases to a sub-
329. Solicitor General Starr raised the argument that Perkins, as a prisoner serving out an unre-
lated sentence, endured a sub-threshold level of restraint. PrmoNoRm's BiuF, supra note 224, at
10-14 (citation omitted). The Court did not even address the argument, perhaps because it had
soundly rejected the same proposal in Mathis.
330. But see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305-06 (two officers' questioning of teenager, con-
ducted in parents' living room with parents present, conceded by state and left undisturbed by
Court as Miranda violation).
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threshold level. In neither "significant deprivations" case did the Court
credit the pull that police interrogation exerted on the suspect.
The next decision, Berkemer, was aberrational. Absent the elusive in-
dicia of full-fledged "arrest," traffic stops evade Miranda's reach. But
because the Court conceded that its holding deviated from Miranda's
protection of significant deprivations of freedom, the decision should
be read as an exception to Miranda, if not as a partial overruling of
that portion of Miranda's holding. Perhaps the Court perceived that it
had no option but to flout Miranda, which would have called for ex-
clusion under any integrative understanding of custodial interrogation.33'
In contrast, Innis and Mauro did not purport to deviate from Mir-
anda. Those cases illustrate the obstacles that any suspect who hopes to
suppress "functional equivalent" interrogation faces. In Innis, the
Court's preoccupation with discerning the true meaning of the handi-
capped-children dialogue led it to ignore that while the officers con-
versed beside the suspect, Innis rode handcuffed in the back of a caged
police wagon at 4:30 a.m. through the streets of Providence without
any inkling as to what would happen next (or when). Mauro featured
the same shortsighted approach on the Court's part, but on closer
facts. Like Innis, Mauro involved a suspect under undisputedly severe
custodial restraint. Police tactics played upon different sensibilities than
in Innis, however. In Mauro, it was Mrs. Mauro's understandable
panic and dismay that facilitated the Flagstaff Police Department's for-
tuitous extraction of statements that enabled the prosecution to attack
Mr. Mauro's insanity defense. Given that an inanimate, passive tape-
recorder was less able to compel than was the police-directed play upon
Innis's guilt, synergy shows the difference between the two cases to be
one of degree and not of kind. In both cases, synergy would call for
suppression of the incriminating statements.
Finally, in Perkins, the relevance of synergy was lost for the same
reasons as in Berkemer. On its face, the case cried out for Miranda
warnings, even when both components are viewed separately. Even
without considering the synergistic relationship of custody and interro-
gation, Perkins clearly was in custody and subjected to interrogation.
Rather than turn. on the Court's insensitivity to the interactive nature
of custody and interrogation, the facts of Perkins tested the fringes of
Miranda, where mechanistic application of the two-step analysis was in-
appropriate.
331. The same can be said of Quarles, where the Court was more forthright about its articula-
tion of a new exception to Miranda. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655 (articulating
"public safety" exception to requirement that Miranda warnings be given before suspect's state-
ments can be admitted into evidence).
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CONCLUSION
Were the Court to recognize the effects of synergy, more confessions
would be suppressed than under the Court's current approach. To be
sure, when juxtaposed against the current approach, the synergy model
looks like a one-way street: it is generally not a tool for preserving
confessions for trial. 332 In addition to its role (whether positive or nega-
tive) in increasing the volume of suppressed confessions, the synergy
theory may alert judges and lawyers to the application problems en-
demic to the "functional equivalent" tests currently plaguing judicial
review of what constitutes a "significant deprivation of freedom" and
"interrogation."
In the case of significant deprivations of freedom, the poverty of the
functional-equivalent (of arrest) test goes beyond application difficulties:
the test borders on subversive interpretation. The disjunctive use of the
word "or" in Miranda demonstrates the Court's intent to create two
types of restraint in which questioning by police leading to a confession
would be presumed compelled if unattended by warnings and a valid
waiver: "[W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way.1 3
This provision was not inserted into the Miranda opinion cavalierly;
five separate references to the two types of custodial restraint appear. 34
Despite this disjunctive construction, significant deprivations now re-
quire the characteristics of something which clearly they are not - set-
tings of custody. In order to return this distinct class of circumstances
to the field of constitutional protection, something must change. Syn-
ergy is a way both to bring back judicial respect for significant depri-
vations of freedom and, on the interrogation side, to obviate the
intractable "likelihood" problems that plague inquiries into whether po-
lice conduct was the functional equivalent of direct questioning.
The synergy model also is sensitive to the commonsense need, illus-
trated in Perkins, to avoid extracting from Miranda more than it has
to give. In cases in which police conduct clearly is outside Miranda's
intended scope, if not its literal language, synergy, like any other ap-
proach, can be averted by exception. Perkins is such an example. 3" But
as convincing as Perkins may be, exceptions are not always so easy to
digest. In Berkemer, the Court's only proof that Miranda should be
332. But see Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (confession admissible despite
forces of synergy).
333. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 478 (emphasis added).
334. Id. at 444, 445, 467, 477, 478.
335. See also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 2650 (1990) (announcing "'routine book-
ing question' exception); supra note 119 (discussing Muniz).
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avoided was the justices' unsubstantiated belief that drivers are familiar
with roadside traffic stops. If exceptions like Berkemer continue to
emerge, soon they could work their .way in from Miranda's fringes to
its core. Exceptions could arise where warnings requirements are held
to be inapplicable to, for example, sophisticated suspects (who certainly
know their rights) or, worse, mentally incompetent suspects (who cer-
tianly do not). At the end of this slope, short of outright overruling, is
an emasculated Miranda rule, reduced to its facts.
Equally possible is that the exceptions to Miranda are less pernicious
than that. What once was the Court's great new experiment - the ex-
clusionary rule - emerged in response to pre-incorporation police prac-
tices that paid little respect to criminal suspects. In its early stages, the
exclusionary rule may have been overprotective. Neither extreme, pre-
incorporation practices nor zealous application of the exclusionary rule,
properly assessed the scope of the penalty of exclusion. At some point,
a more measured evaluation of exclusion had to emerge. 36
A commonsense middle ground, however, is unattainable. Pressure to
weigh realistically the cost of forcing the government to ignore a sus-
pect's confession and to ferret out, perhaps in vain, other less convinc-
ing evidence in order to secure a conviction, is counterbalanced by
constitutional guarantees, their integrity maintained only through strict
observance. Why, when, and against whom should government prevail
despite existing legal barriers to admissibility? How could a middle
ground avoid taking on a predictable accordion-like quality, expanding
and contracting according to extralegal considerations? For those who
propose to relieve the tension between law enforcement and individual
rights, I suggest that the burden of proof rests on any party who seeks
to narrow the breadth of constitutional guarantees.
Even for some who favor individual rights to more convictions, the
overbreadth of Miranda's presumption has lost much of its luster. Con-
cededly, where it applies the presumption is absolute. Yet in determin-
ing its applicability, the presumption is a matter of degree, even under
a bright-line index. Whether or not the Court adheres to its current
approach or expands its view to an in pari materia reading of both
components leaves this observation unchanged. Under any view, the
threshold decision of whether Miranda warnings are required is a judi-
cial measurement of compulsion. Given that some method of measure-
ment is inevitable, the proper method must consider custody and
interrogation together, not separately. When, as a matter of degree,
those two components, read together, collectively reach Miranda's
336. See generally Allen, supra note 5, at 535-37.
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threshold compulsion level, then absent a reasoned exception, the social
cost of exclusion is simply the unavoidable compliment that law-abiding
citizens, through their Constitution, pay to themselves - the potential
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